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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court fail to properly instruct 
the jury on the legal duty owed by a possessor of land to a 
business invitee to warn the invitee about hazardous con-
ditions to be encountered on the land? 
2. Did the court fail to instruct the jury about 
the legal definition of "unreasonable risk" as stated in 
Section 343/ Restatement of Torts, Second? 
i n 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict of no cause 
of action against the defendant and from a denial of plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
Disposition of Case in Lower Court 
A jury trial was held in this case on October 2 and 
3 1984, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding. The jury 
was given instructions prepared by the Court asking whether 
the defendant was negligent in his operation of a waterslide 
on which plaintiff was injured. Based on the instruction 
given itf the jury concluded that the defendant was not 
negligent. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. 
Plaintiff requested a new trial in the case which was 
denied. An order to that effect was entered on December 14, 
1984. An appeal was filed on January 7, 1985. 
Statement of Facts 
On June 21, 1982 plaintiff Walter Wagoner, family 
members and some friends went to the Burchcreek Waterslide 
in Ogden, to use the waterslide facilities. Mr. Wagoner had 
never before ridden a waterslide. Shortly after arriving at 
the facility he cut the tendon of his right great toe when 
his foot went out over the top of the waterslide as he came 
out of a turn and contacted an unfinished roughened, outer 
edge of the fiberglass waterslide. At the time of his 
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injury he was using the waterslide in a proper recommended 
fashion by sliding on his chest on a rubbermat provided by 
the facility for that purpose. 
The waterslide itself was of fiberglass 
construction. The top of the waterslide was open. It had 
been manufactured and installed in 1979 and in operation 
each summer thereafter. 
When the waterslide components were originally 
manufactured there was a rounded edge at the top of the 
waterslide which flared out into an unfinished edge of rough 
fiberglass on each outer edge of the fiberglass sections. 
(R.29, Exhibits 2P, 3P, 4P and 5P) When the components were 
assembled into the complete waterslide the rough, unfinished 
edge of fiberglass extended the entire length of the 
waterslide along both outer edges of the slide. 
At the top of the waterslide is an entry pool from 
which access is gained to the slide itself. There is a 
splash pool at the bottom of the waterslide. (R.440) Water 
flowing down the interior of the waterslide has two func-
tions. First it moistens the fiberglass so a person can 
slide; secondly it acts to slow a person down by creating a 
wave of water in front of the slide user which acts as a 
brake. (R. 440) If the water is prevented from flowing down 
the slide, leaving only the moist fiberglass, a rider will 
reach a higher speed. (R.441) Also, a smaller person will 
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not generally go down the slide as fast as a larger person 
(R.442) and if several riders join together to form a train 
they will likewise increase their speed down the waterslide. 
(R.443) In this case, plaintiff Walter Wagoner was 6f3^" 
tall and weighed 250 lbs. when injured so he would automati-
cally have gone down the waterslide faster than a normal 
sized man. (R.443-444) 
As a person goes through the curves of a waterslide 
their momentum propels them upward on the outer edge of the 
slide as they go through a turn. (R.444-445) In factf if 
their speed becomes too great through the curves they can 
literally pop right out of the top of this Rind of 
waterslide. This had occurred once previously at the 
Burchcreek Waterslide. (R.447) As a person goes through a 
turn his arms or legs automatically come in closer proximi-
ty to the exposed, unfinished edge of the waterslide with a 
greater potential for getting cut if an arm or leg extends 
over the top curved edge of the slide. 
The exposed edge of this waterslide, on which 
plaintiff was cut, is about four inches from the curved top 
of the waterslide. (R.432 and 437) It was not uncommon for 
riders to grab the upper, curved edge to slow down (R.437) 
So it was clearly known and expected that riders arms or 
legs would routinely be within four inches of the exposed 
outer edge of rough fiberglass. (R. 437). 
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The trial testimony of defendant Neal Citte con-
cerning the danger presented by the outer edge of the 
waterslide is important for purposes of this appeal. 
Q. But that edge, if a person were sliding 
down the waterslide and in motion and a por-
tion of their body—arm, fingers, feet, 
whatever—came in contact with that unfi-
nished edge, it has the capacity to cut 
them? 
A. Yes. (R. 432) 
Mr. Hasenyager: Q. All right. So at least 
with hands, it is foreseeable that someone 
would have fingers within four inches of 
this unfinished edge that Mr. Wagoner was 
cut on? 
A. Ifve already answered that, yes. 
Q. All right. I think then you would agree 
Mr. Citte, would you not, that that 
roughened edge is dangerous if a person 
comes in contact with it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And its dangerous of course because a 
person could get cut? 
A. Yes. (R. 439-440) 
Q. All right. Now, the answer that you 
gave me of bordering up the sides too far 
and actually making it so your body might 
protrude out of the slide, its a hazard that 
was known in the use of the waterslide if a 
person got going fast enough? 
A. When you say it was a hazard that was 
known, I rode the slide before and you know, 
on anything there's limitations and there's 
a point you don't feel safe, but when. . . . 
I rode the slide, I felt there was a point 
of being safe and unsafe. 
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Q. All right. Let's talk about the point 
where a person becomes unsafe riding the 
slide. Where a person becomes unsafe is 
when the speed builds up far enough that 
they rise up to the wall and they are put in 
close proximity to this roughened edge where 
they can become cut, isnft that true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. So one of the dangers of this slidef 
which is Known to you as the owner, was that 
the roughened edge. The outside edge posed 
a danger to sliders who come in proximity 
with it? 
A. That's why we told them not to hold the 
water back. (R.448-449) 
Q. All right. But as a parallel to that, 
you've already told us that edge was 
roughened, that it was dangerous, you con-
sidred it so, and that is a hazard of the 
slide, right? 
A. Yes. (R.450) 
Q. Now Mr. Citte, when a person is riding 
the waterslide—you've seen a lot of people 
go down that slide, haven't you? 
A. Fair share. 
Q. Okay. There are times when an inex-
perienced person could lose control of their 
arms or legs as they go through the curbes, 
aren't there? Is's fair to say that could 
happen? 
A. It would be fair to say an inexperienced 
person could lose control. When you say 
their arms or legs would protrude like 
you're trying to infer— 
Q. Well, I haven't said that. My question 
is only that they could lose control of 
where their arms or legs are, isn't that 
true? 
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A. I guess it's possible, sure. 
Q. And in fact, that's not an uncommon 
thing either is it? People hit those curves 
and they'll—their arms will go one direc-
tion and/or their feet or another arm may go 
up over that edge. That's not uncommon? 
A, No, I wouldn't —when you say it's not 
uncommon, I've seen it happen, sure. 
Q. You've seen it happen, you knew it does 
happen from time to time. 
A. Sure. 
Q. It's an expected occurrence, right? 
A. It can happen, sure. 
Q. Okay. In those curcumstances where 
somebody loses their control of their arms, 
their arms could go all different directions 
and the same with their legs, isn't that 
true? 
A. I imagine, 
Q. Okay. That is a known and expected cir-
cumstance in riding the waterslide, isn't 
it? 
A. It's happened. 
Q. Okay. And that can happen when a per-
son is riding the slide correctly without 
holding the water back, can't it? 
A. I think it could happen (R.458-459) 
Q. All right. And the third question is 
that you never warned any of the users of 
the waterslide about a risk or hazard of 
getting cut if their arms or legs protruded 
out over that edge? 
A. No. (R.460) 
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Q. So you1re not meaning to imply that the 
average rider or the first-time rider, like 
Mr. Wagoner wasf would look at that edge and 
a light would go on in his head and he'd say 
you know, better keep my arms and legs in 
because I could get cut; you're not implying 
that, are? 
A. No, I have not implied that. (R. 495) 
From the excerpts of Mr. Citte's testimony cited 
above it is clear that Mr. Wagoner was injured in a fore-
seeeable manner when his foot came into contact with a 
dangerous condition of the waterslide, known to exist by the 
slide owner, who had not warned slide users about the 
hazard. 
It was the defendant's contention at trial that 
because no one had been previously injured in a similar 
fashion the risk of injury was not unreasonable and he 
therefore had no legal duty to warn users about the hazard, 
nor any responsibility to guard the hazard or remove it. 
The trial court then prepared its own special ver-
dict jury instructions which contained the following 
interrogatory number 1: 
Do you find it proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant was negligent 
in the manner in which he used the slides 
with the edge as it was and did he expose the 
plaintiff to an unreasonable rish of injury? 
(R.351) 
The interrogatory was followed by an explanation 
prepared by the trial judge. (R. 351-352) 
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Plaintifffs Objections were taken to the courts 
proposed instruction (R. 498-503) and in partinent part were 
made primarily because the explanations given in conjunction 
with the first interrogatory did not inform the jury that 
the defendant had an affirmative duty to, at a minimum, warn 
slide users of known hazards they would encounter in using 
the waterslide. Also, the jury was given no guidance as to 
the legal definition of "unreasonable risk" nor the factors 
to be considered in determining whether or not a risk was 
unreasonable. 
Summary of Argument 
The jury was improperly insturcted on the law con-
cerning the duty of a possessor of land to a business invi-
tee because they were not informed that the possessor of 
land has an affirmative duty to warn invitees about hazar-
dous conditions they will encounter on the land in cir-
cumstances where the hazard it not obvious and the jury was 
not instructed about the nature of an unreasonable risk. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE DUTY OWED BY THE POSSESSOR OF 
LAND TO A BUSINESS INVITEE TO WARN THE 
INVITEE ABOUT HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS TO BE 
ENCOUNTERED ON THE LAND. 
Section 343, Restatement of Torts, Second States: 
§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or 
Discoverable by Possessor. 
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he 
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a) Knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk 
of harm to such invitees, and 
b) should expect that they will not discover 
or realize the danger, or will fail to pro-
tect themselves against it, and 
c) fails to exercise reasonable care to pro-
tect them against the danger. 
The comment notes to Section 343 in pertinent part 
say that the invitee on land 
• . . He is entitled to expect such care not 
only in the original construction of the pre-
mises, and any activities of the possessor or 
his employees which may affect their con-
dition, but also in inspection to discover 
their actual condition and any latent 
defects, followed by such repair, safeguards, 
or warning as may be reasonably necessary for 
his protection under the circumstances, 
(emphasis added) 
. . . To the invitee the possessor owes not 
only this duty, but also the additional duty 
to exercise reasonable affirmative care to 
see that the premises are safe for the recep-
tion of the visitor, or at least to ascertain 
the condition of the land and to give such 
warning that the visitor may decide intelli-
gently whether or not to accept the invita-
tion, or may protect himself against the 
danger if he does accept it. (emph a sis 
added) 
It is clear from the language of the Restatement 
Comments that once a possessor of land knows of a dangerous 
condition on the land he must, at a minimum, give the invi-
tee a warning about the hazard if he chooses not to remove 
or guard against the hazard. 
This was the precise holding in Odell v. Cook's 
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Market, Inc., 432 S.W. 2d 382 (Mo. App. 1968). The plain-
tiff fell in a store when she slipped on a mixture of water 
and lettuce or cabbage leaves. The Court cited Section 343 
of the Restatement and said that the defendant had "the 
alternate duty either to remove the wet leaves that created 
the dangerous condition or warn Mrs. O'Dell of the dangerous 
condition that existed on the floor." 
This case is significant for two reasons. First, 
dangerous condition is used synonymously with unreasonable 
risk of harm, the specific language of Section 343. i.e. a 
dangerous condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm 
unless corrected or warned about. Secondly, it recognizes 
the affirmative nature of the duty to remove the dangerous 
condition or warn about it. Either conduct fulfills the 
affirmative duty of care. Ignoring the dangerous condition 
does not. 
In the instruction given by the trial court in this 
case, the affirmative duty to warn slide users about a known 
dangerous condition was ignored by the court. Also, the 
court simply asked the two part question was the defendant 
negligent in his use of the slide with the edge as it was 
and did the defendant expose plaintiff to an unreasonable 
risk of injury. 
If there does actually exist an affirmative duty 
under Section 343 to warn slide users about a known 
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dangerous condition then the defendant was negligent as a 
matter of law in this instance because he clearly knew of 
the hazard and failed to warn plaintiff or anyone else about 
the hazard. 
If the issue of negligence must be analyzed from 
the standpoint of whether the risk was unreasonable before 
the minimum duty to warn about a known dangerous condition 
arises then the instruction given by the court was still 
inadequate because it did not define unreasonable risk. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ABOUT THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF UNREASONABLE 
RISK OR THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN 
DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT A RISK IS 
UNREASONABLE. 
Under Section 291, Restatement of Torts, Second a 
risk is unreasonable and the act (or here omission) negli-
gent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what 
the law regards as the utility of the act or of the par-
ticular manner in which it is done. In determining the uti-
lity of the act under Section 292, Restatement of Torts, 
Second there must be some social value advanced or protected 
by leaving an unfinished, roughened fiberglass edge on the 
waterslide when that edge had the recognized capacity to 
cause injury if contacted. Or, some particular social value 
in failing or justifying the failure to warn slide users 
about the edge so they could take reasonable steps to pro-
-11-
tect themselves from contracting the edge if they chose to 
use the waterslide. 
It is difficult to see any utility or social value 
of any kind that would justify or excuse the failure to warn 
in this instance. The defendant attempted at trial to 
excuse his failure to warn patrons about the edge by 
testifying that over a million rides had taken place down 
the waterslide without anyone previously being cut like 
plaintiff. That, of course, is not a complete test of uti-
lity or social value in this case. The test is whether the 
defendant had any public or private interest that was 
advanced or protected by failing to warn about the hazardous 
condition. It includes the magnitude of the risk, the 
possible extent of harm or injury that might result to a 
user and a consideration of individual and societal rights 
and obligations. i.e. is there any social utility or value 
in exposing slide users to the risk of injury by being cut 
on a known, dangerous, unfinished, outer edge of the 
waterslide. Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 703 F. 2d 
921, 924 (1983). Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W. 2d 759, 770 
(1977). When a known hazard is present that could be easily 
warned about there is no possible public or private interest 
belonging to the defendant which was greater than the 
general public interest in having waterslide users ride the 
waterslide free of injury or at a minimum with full disclo-
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sure of the risks involved in use of the waterslide so they 
could intelligently decide whether or not to accept the risk 
and use the waterslide anyway. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above plaintiff request that 
the court order a new trial in this case. 
DATED this An day of April, 1985. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
tfil^ S*b 
rames R. Hasenyage^ 
CERTIFlgATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on thi s //>_ day of 
April, 1985, I mailed 4 true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Roger H. 
Bullock, Attorney for Respondent, Sixth Floor Boston 
Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Ch. 13 CONDITION AND USE OF LAND § 3 4 3 
k. Where learning inadequate: JThere will, however, be 
special situations in which the possessor has knowledge of facts 
from which he should realize that an ordinary warning will not 
be sufficient to notify the licensee of the danger, or to enable 
him to protect himself against it. Thus where the possessor 
knows that the licensee is blind, illiterate, or a foreigner, or a child 
too young to be able to read, it is not enough to rely upon a 
posted notice to give warning of the danger, and the possessor 
may still be required to exercise reasonable care to give adequate 
warning in some other way. In extreme cases, as in the case of 
the blind man, he may even be required to give physical assistance 
to enable the licensee to avoid the danger. 
I. Dangers known to licensee. The licensee, who enters 
land with no more than bare permission, is entitled to nothing 
more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers which he 
will encounter if he comes. If he is warned of the actual con-
ditions, and the dangers involved, or if he discovers them for 
himself without such warning, and fully understands and ap-
preciates the risk, he is in a position to make an intelligent 
choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is sufficient to 
justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining. 
Therefore, even though a dangerous condition is concealed and 
not obvious, and the possessor has given the licensee no warn-
ing, if the licensee is in fact fully aware of the condition and 
the risk, there is no liability to him. 
TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS 
OF LAND TO INVITEES 
§ 3 4 3 . Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by 
Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land 
if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves 
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or re-
alize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves 
against it, and 
B— Appendix lor Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
215 
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§ 343 TORTS, SECOND Ch. 13 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them 
against the danger. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. This Section should be read together with § 343 A, 
which deals with the effect of the fact that the condition is 
known to the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact 
that the invitee is a patron of a public utility. That Section 
limits the liability here stated. In the interest of brevity, the 
limitation is not repeated in this Section. 
6. Distinction between duties to licensee and invitee. One 
who holds his land open for the reception of invitees is under 
a greater duty in respect to its physical condition than one who 
permits the visit of a mere licensee. The licensee enters with 
the understanding that he will take the land as the possessor 
himself uses it. Therefore such a licensee is entitled to expect 
only that he will be placed upon an equal footing with the pos-
sessor himself by an adequate disclosure of any dangerous condi-
tions that are known to the possessor. On the other hand an 
invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that 
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his re-
ception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will 
exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, 
or for his use for the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled 
to expect such care not only in the original construction of the 
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees 
which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover 
their actual condition and any latent defects, followed by such 
repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary 
for his protection under the circumstances. 
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the 
duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous 
conditions which are known to the possessor, and are likely not 
to be discovered by the licensee. To the invitee the possessor 
owes not only this duty, but also the additional duty to exercise 
reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe for 
the reception of the visitor, or at least to ascertain the condition 
of the land, and to give such warning that the visitor may de-
cide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation, or may 
protect himself against the danger if he does accept it. 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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Ch. 13 CONDITION AND USE OF LAND § 3 4 3 
As stated in § 342, the possessor is under no duty to pro-
tect the licensee against dangers of which the licensee knows 
or has reason to know. On the other hand, as stated in § 343 A, 
there are some situations in which there is a duty to protect an 
invitee against even known dangers, where the possessor should 
anticipate harm to the invitee notwithstanding such knowledge. 
c. As to invitees who go beyond the scope of the invita-
tion, as to either time or place, see § 332, Comment I. 
d. What invitee entitled to expect. An invitee is entitled 
to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain 
the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, 
either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning 
of the actual condition and the risk involved therein. Therefore 
an invitee is not required to be on the alert to discover defects 
which, if he were a mere licensee, entitled to expect nothing but 
notice of known defects, he might be negligent in not discovering. 
This is of importance in determining whether the visitor is or 
is not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to discover 
a defect, as well as in determining whether the defect is one 
which the possessor should believe that his visitor would not 
discover, and as to which, therefore, he must use reasonable care 
to warn the visitor. 
e. Preparation required for invitee. In determining the 
extent of preparation which an invitee is entitled to expect to 
be made for his protection, the nature of the land and the pur-
poses for which it is used are of great importance. One who 
enters a private residence even for purposes connected with the 
owner's business, is entitled to expect only such preparation as 
a reasonably prudent householder makes for the reception of 
such visitors. On the other hand, one entering a store, theatre, 
office building, or hotel, is entitled to expect that his host will 
make far greater preparations to secure the safety of his patrons 
than a householder will make for his social or even his business 
visitors. So too, one who goes on business to the executive 
offices in a factory, is entitled to expect that the possessor will 
exercise reasonable care to secure his visitor's safety. If, how-
ever, on some particular occasion, he is invited to go on business 
into the factory itself, he is not entitled to expect that special 
preparation will be made for his safety, but is entitled to expect 
only such safety as he would find in a properly conducted factory. 
/ . Appliances used on land. A possessor who holds his 
land open to others must possess and exercise a knowledge of the 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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dangerous qualities of the place itself and the appliances pro-
vided therein, which is not required of his patrons. Thus, the 
keeper of a boardinghouse is negligent in providing a gas stove 
to be used in an unventilated bathroom, although the boarder 
who is made ill by the fumes uses the bathroom with knowledge 
of all the circumstances, except the risk of so doing. This is 
true because the boardinghouse keeper, even though a man of 
the same class as his boarders, is required to have a superior 
knowledge of the dangers incident to the facilities which he 
furnishes to them. 
g. As to the duty of a possessor of business premises to 
protect his invitees from harm threatened thereon by third per-
sons, see § 344. 
§ 3 4 3 A« Known or Obvious Dangers 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condi-
tion on the land whose danger is known or obvious to 
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should an-
ticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact 
that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or 
of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of impor-
tance indicating that the harm should be anticipated. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment on Subsection (1) : 
a. The rule stated in this Subsection applies to all persons 
who enter or remain on land in the capacity of invitees, as defined 
in § 332. It includes in particular the patrons of a public utility 
who enter land in its possession seeking its services, to which as 
members of the public they are entitled; and it includes members 
of the public making use of the land of the government or a gov-
ernment agency which is held open for the use of the public. As 
is stated in Subsection (2), such a public utility, government, 
or government agency may have special reason to anticipate that 
one who so enters will proceed to encounter known or obvious 
dangers; and such a defendant may therefore be subject to lia-
bility in some cases where the ordinary possessor of land would 
not. 
See Appendix for Reporter 8 Notes, Court Citations, and Cross Reference* 
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prior positions and courses of movement of 
the injured pedestrian and the defendant 
motorist. Those crucial factors distin-
guish the cited cases from ours. Here, the 
evidence is more akin to the cases of Davis 
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 316 
S.W.2d 494 [8, 9] ; Wapelhorst v. Lindner, 
Mo., 269 S.W.2d 865 [7, 8 ] ; Hartlage v. 
Halloran, Mo.App., 331 S.W.2d 197 [3]. 
In each, plaintiff lost by failing to show the 
relative prior positions and courses of trav-
el of the plaintiff pedestrian and the defend-
ant motorist. We reach the same result 
here. 
We hold that the plaintiff failed to make 
a submissible humanitarian case. The trial 
court correctly set aside plaintiff's verdict 
and judgment and entered judgment for the 
defendants. That judgment should be af-
firmed. 
PER CURIAM: 
The foregoing opinion of CLEMENS, C, 
is adopted as the opinion of this court. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment for defendants is 
affirmed. 
ANDERSON, p f j . , RUDDY, J., and P. 
F. PALUMBO, Special Judge, concur. 
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Audrey Ann O'DELL and Paul O'Dell, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
v. 
COOK'S MARKET, INC., Defendant, 
Respondent. 
No. 32914. 
St. Louis Court of Appeals. 
Missouri. 
Sept. 17, 1968. 
Action by invitee and her husband to 
recover for invitee's injuries and husband's 
medical expenses and loss of consortium 
resulting when invitee slipped on wet cab-
bage or lettuce leaves in defendant's store. 
The Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, J. 
Casey Walsh, J., sustained defendant's mo-
tion for judgment in accordance with his 
motion for directed verdict and appeal was 
taken. The Court of Appeals, Ruddy, J.t 
held that since invitee was aware of the 
dangerous condition defendant was not lia-
ble for failure to warn invitee of condition, 
and invitee, who had observed and been 
warned by mother of condition 30 minutes 
prior to fall, was not distracted and was 
not prevented from seeing condition at 
time of fall in well-lighted store, was con-
t r ibu to ry negligent. 
Affirmed. 
I.^Negligence <§=»48, 52 
A landowner is liable for bodily harm 
caused an invitee by a natural or artificial 
condition on the land if landowner knows, 
or with use of reasonable care should 
know, of condition which, if known, would 
cause landowner to realize it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to invitees, 
landowner has no reason to believe invitees 
will discover condition or realize risk, and 
landowner invites or permits invitees to re-
main without exercising reasonable care to 
remedy the condition or warn invitees. 
2. Negligence <§=48 
Basis of landowner's liability to invitee 
is superior knowledge of an unreasonable 
risk of harm of which the invitee, in exer-
cise of ordinary care, does not or should 
not know of. 
3. Negligence <£=>52 
Landowner must warn invitee of exist-
ing conditions on the land which involve 
an unreasonable risk of harm, but he need 
not make repeated warnings. 
4. Negligence <§=>50, 52 
Storekeeper had duty either to remove 
wet leaves that created dangerous cond»* 
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O'DELL v. COOK 
Cite as 432 
tjon or to warn invitee of dangerous condi-
tion, but not both. 
5. Negligence <§=>48 
Only when a dangerous condition on 
the premises is known to the landowner 
a nd not known to invitee who is injured, is 
a recovery permitted. 
$. Negligence €=>66(l) 
There is no liability of landowner for 
injuries from dangers that are obvious, or 
as well known to person injured as to land-
owner. 
7. Negligence <§=>66(l) 
}l Invitee, who slipped on wet cabbage or 
lettuce leaves in store where lighting was 
good, she was not distracted, she had seen 
the condition and been warned by her 
mother that it was dangerous 30 minutes 
"previous to fall and she was not prevented 
from seeing the dangerous condition at 
time of fall, was contr ibutory negligent. 
8. Negligence <S=>69 
t?~, Forgetfulness, when nothing has oc-
curred to distract the mind, does not ex-
cuse ^ negligence based on knowledge of 
Joangerous condition. 
JkNegligence <S>69 
( ^ A s s u m i n g invitee who fell on wet cab-
' wge or lettuce leaves in store forgot that 
j&e had observed and been warned by her 
ifjgjfcer of the condition 30 minutes pre-
'-St?^.*0 ^ » forgetfulness was not ex-
*»ed where nothing occurred to distract in-
S MARKET, INC. 
S.W.2d 382 
RUDDY, Judge. 
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j | * f B. Marglous, Clayton, for plain-
"Ppellants. 
**r, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary & 
St. Louis, for defendant-respond-
Audrey Ann O'Dell, wife of Paul O'Dell 
was injured when she slipped and fell in 
defendant's store on either lettuce or cab-
bage leaves mixed with water. She and 
her husband jointly brought this action. 
She to recover damages for her injuries 
and he to recover for medical expenses and 
loss of consortium. A jury trial resulted 
in a verdict in favor of the wife in the 
sum of $1500 and in favor of the husband 
in the sum of $500. The trial court sus-
tained defendant's motion for judgment in 
accordance with its motions for a directed 
verdict filed by it at the close of all of the 
evidence and entered a judgment in favor 
of defendant against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
appeal. 
Mrs. O'Dell went to the store of the de-
fendant in an automobile driven by her 
husband. Mr. O'Dell remained in the 
automobile and Mrs. O'Dell, her young son 
and her mother entered the store about 
8:00 P.M. on June 16, 1965. It was the in-
tention of Mrs. O'Dell and her mother to 
shop for their respective needs. Each pro-
cured a cart in which to put her purchases. 
There were not many customers in the 
store that evening. Mrs. O'Dell and her 
mother shopped through the various meat 
and grocery departments of the store as 
well as at the vegetable counter. Mrs. 
O'Dell did not believe that she purchased 
any of the vegetables. There were no cus-
tomers in the vegetable department when 
they passed through. As they got to the 
vegetable counter in the course of their 
shopping tour Mrs. O'Dell noticed that the 
floor was wet in spots and that it had de-
bris which she described as either lettuce 
or cabbage leaves. It covered an area of 
one square foot. At that time she saw the 
manager of the store and a clerk in the 
vegetable department. The mother of Mrs. 
O'Dell testified that she told her daughter 
to " 'be careful' * * * 'it looks kind of 
messy in there. '" Her daughter did not 
respond to this admonition or say anything 
to her. Mrs. O'Dell testified that she did 
not remember her mother saying anything 
to her and that she said nothing to her 
mother about the presence of the leaves and 
water on the floor at the time they first 
went through the vegetable department. 
Mrs. O'Dell was wearing a pair of low flat 
heeled shoes. She testified that the light-
ing was adequate and that she had no trou-
ble seeing where she was going. About 
thirty minutes after she and her mother 
left the vegetable area they arrived at the 
checkout counter of the store where a 
clerk would compute the sum owed for the 
purchases made. While her mother's pur-
chases were being computed Mrs. O'Dell 
remembered that she wanted to purchase 
an avocado for salad. She gave her moth-
er her purse and told her to set it on the 
mother's cart while she went back to get 
the avocado. As she was going through 
the vegetable department on her way to get 
the avocado she slipped and fell. She tes-
tified, "I slid and I fell." Her leg folded 
under her and she fell in a sitting position. 
She testified that she knew she had fallen 
on something because she went down "too 
fast." After she had fallen she looked 
back from her sitting position to see what 
she had fallen on and she noticed a skid 
mark "that was either lettuce, or cabbage, 
mixed with water," and noticed some of 
the mixture on her left shoe. She de-
scribed it as a green, slimy substance. She 
said it was all over the bottom of the sole 
of her left shoe. While she was sitting on 
the floor she saw a boy picking up leaves 
from the floor. He was about twelve to 
eighteen feet in front of her. When Mrs. 
O'Dell failed to return to the checkout 
counter her mother told Mrs. O'Dell's son 
to go back and see what happened to the 
mother. Upon learning from the boy of her 
daughter's fall she went to her daughter's 
assistance. She described the area at the 
time as "sort of damp, and a few little 
greens on the floor." The mother thought 
the condition of the floor was about the 
same as the first time she and her daughter 
went through the vegetable department 
She saw what she described as lettuce on 
her daughter's left foot and that her daugh-
ter's slim jims were all green and wet 
":eer zl^i zzxo the store picked up Mrs. 
O ' l t l — carried her out to the automo-
r l t I r D'Dell testified that when he 
!>Di-e~ — ~e floor he noticed it was wet 
and =cx i "ertuce leaf clinging to the sole 
of bir 7-f*"s shoe. He noticed one of the 
yorrr z^ctry clerks picking vegetable 
leare^ ~zz : : the floor. He said the light-
~ r " - " - r -g in the store were adequate 
a: tne —c and he had no difficulty seeing 
wher^ z=. Tras going. He said the store 
VET T^I lighted. Mrs. O'Dell testified 
rhsr xzzzz sit returned to the vegetable de-
parrr^r: zz obtain the avocado she ob-
server zz employees or customers in the 
V?PT.- - department and when asked if 
there T^T scything to distract her she an-
swers ~> j . " When asked if there was 
ary " r zz prevent her from seeing the 
\tzzzzt "eaves on the floor if she had 
loostz 25 answered that she was not look-
ing- n: ^ e floor at the time but said there 
wa= zzzzzzzz to prevent her from seeing the 
Iemce js-res on the floor had she looked. 
The r e a r e r of the store testified that be-
tween f±een and thirty minutes before he
 % 
\ezrzszz zz Mrs. O'Dell's fall he was in the 
r f r ? - * area for the purpose of helping 
azszzTz^Zz and checking supplies. He said 
he -*-££ have checked to see whether or 
no: ±ere was any debris on the floor. It 
was :ne :£ his responsibilities to look after 
the ssfs. He was told by one of the 
cleris zzzz Mrs. O'Dell had fallen and he 
wen zz There she had fallen and said he 
looifiiirhe floor and saw nothing. 
The zzzzsz was submitted to the jury ott 
the alepd ground that defendant failed to 
use trzrary care to remove the wet let* 
tuce rr rabbage leaves on the floor after & 
kneir zz could have known of the unsafe 
coarrrr and that Mrs. O'Dell did not 
knc*r szd could not have known of the tn*~ 
safe zznlrSon of the floor. 
P l r r r f s contend that the trial corf 
errei zz setting aside the jury verdict # 
fare? cf the plaintiffs and entering a JQ<* 
mem =: favor of the defendant because tf* 
evizerce shows that defendant had ciw^ 
_ _ ._ » —<• M.W AM. I I A ) JLJ.X V/» 
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tual or constructive notice of the condi-
tion 0f the floor and was negligent in per-
t t i n g the wet leaves to remain on the 
flnor f ° r a P e n ° d of thirty minutes and 
f rther contends that Mrs O'Dell vvas not 
contnbutonly negligent as a matter of law 
* failing to remember the presence of the 
.
 e s 0n the floor, which she had pre-
uSu observed thirty minutes prior there-
, Defendant contends that her knowl-
~?£e of the condition of the floor and her 
"conduct in failing to avoid it constitutes 
contributory negligence as a matter of law 
n_3] Defendant admits that Mrs 
O'Dell was an invitee who was injured on 
Its premises The Supreme Court m the 
case of Harbourn v Katz Drug Company, 
Mo*, 318 S W 2d 226, 74 A L R 2d 938 has 
"«ven the applicable rule go\ ernmg liability 
to an invitee It said (1 c 228, 229) 
* the rule as to defendants' duty 
and liability to one in such status (mvi-
^ tee), as stated in 2 Restatement, Law of 
feTorts, § 343, is as follows 'A possessor 
C o i land is subject to liability for bodily 
llliarni caused to business visitors by a 
fenatural or artificial condition thereon if, 
|U>ut only if, he (a) knows, or by the ex-
s^  erase of reasonable care could discover, 
s^the condition which, if known to him, he 
^should realize as involving an unreasona-
j isk to them, and (b) has no reason 
Jo ^believe that they will discover the 
idition or realize the risk invohed 
^tfarein, and (c) invites or permits them 
^remain upon the land without exercis-
IJ&reasonable care ( I ) to make the con-
lon reasonably safe, or (n) to give a 
ing adequate to enable them to 
Td the harm * * *.' " 
s t oasis of defendant's liability is its su-
*^W knowledge of an unreasonable risk 
of which the invitee, m the exer-
ordinary care, does not or should 
Harbourn v Katz Drug Com-
'-**pra, 1c 229 However, m order 
'dant to fulfill its duty to plaintiff 
wi tee it need not make repeated 
warnings Harbourn v Katz Drug Com-
pany supra, 1 c 231 
[4-6] Also, defendant had only the al-
ternate duty either to remove the wet 
lea\es that created the dangerous condition 
or to warn Mrs O'Dell of the dangerous 
condition that existed on the floor De-
fendant did not have the duty to both re-
move the leaves from the floor and to 
warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition 
If defendant warned plaintiff of the condi-
tion or if plaintiff had the same knowledge 
of the condition as defendant there would 
be no liability on the part of defendant 
Liability of an owner or occupant of prem-
ises is predicated on the owner or proprie-
tor's superior knowledge of the dangerous 
condition and the danger therefrom to per-
sons going upon the premises It is only 
when the dangerous condition is known to 
the owner or occupant of the premises and 
not known to the person injured, that a re-
covery is permitted It follows therefore 
that there is no liability by the owner or 
occupier of the premises for injuries from 
dangers that are obvious, or as well known 
to the person injured as to the owner or oc-
cupant Lamberton v Fish, Mo , 148 S W. 
2d 544,1 c 546 
[7] In the instant case Mrs O'Dell on 
her first trip past the vegetable counter 
thirty minutes before she fell saw that the 
floor was wet and that it had debris which 
she described as either lettuce or cabbage 
leaves on it She said it covered an area 
of one square foot, her mother warned 
her to " 'be careful/ " telling her, " 'it looks 
kind of messy in there ' " Mrs O'Dell did 
not deny that her mother warned her, she 
merely testified that she did not remember 
her mother saying anything to her State 
ex rel and to Use of Williams v Feld 
Chevrolet, Inc , Mo App , 403 S W 2d 672, 
683 The fact is that Mrs O'Dell did ad-
mit that she saw the wet leaves on the 
floor and was fully aware of the danger-
ous condition of the floor at that time 
While the evidence m this case does not 
show that defendant warned Mrs. O'Dell 
to her and that she said nothing to her 
mother about the presence of the leaves and 
water on the floor at the time they first 
went through the vegetable department. 
Mrs. O'Dell was wearing a pair of low flat 
heeled shoes. She testified that the light-
ing was adequate and that she had no trou-
ble seeing where she wras going. About 
thirty minutes after she and her mother 
left the vegetable area they arrived at the 
checkout counter of the store where a 
clerk would compute the sum owed for the 
purchases made. While her mother's pur-
chases were being computed Mrs. O'Dell 
remembered that she wanted to purchase 
an avocado for salad. She gave her moth-
er her purse and told her to set it on the 
mother's cart while she went back to get 
the avocado. As she was going through 
the vegetable department on her way to get 
the avocado she slipped and fell. She tes-
tified, "I slid and I fell." Her leg folded 
under her and she fell in a sitting position. 
She testified that she knew she had fallen 
on something because she went down "too 
fast" After she had fallen she looked 
back from her sitting position to see what 
she had fallen on and she noticed a skid 
mark "that was either lettuce, or cabbage, 
mixed with water," and noticed some of 
the mixture on her left shoe. She de-
scribed it as a green, slimy substance. She 
said it was all over the bottom of the sole 
of her left shoe. While she was sitting on 
the floor she saw a boy picking up leaves 
from the floor. He was about twelve to 
eighteen feet in front of her. When Mrs. 
O'Dell failed to return to the checkout 
counter her mother told Mrs. O'Dell's son 
to go back and see what happened to the 
mother. Upon learning from the boy of her 
daughter's fall she went to her daughter's 
assistance. She described the area at the 
time as "sort of damp, and a few little 
greens on the floor." The mother thought 
the condition of the floor was about the 
same as the first time she and her daughter 
went through the vegetable department. 
She saw what she described as lettuce on 
her daughter's left foot and that her daugh-
ter's slim jims were all green and wet. 
Thereafter, Mrs. O'Dell's husbana wno naa 
been called into the store picked up Mrs. 
O'Dell and carried her out to the automo-
bile. Mr. O'Dell testified that when he 
looked at the floor he noticed it was wet 
and saw a lettuce leaf clinging to the sole 
of his wife's shoe. He noticed one of the 
young grocery clerks picking vegetable 
leaves off of the floor. He said the light-
ing conditions in the store were adequate 
at the time and he had no difficulty seeing 
where he was going. He said the store 
was well lighted. Mrs. O'Dell testified 
that when she returned to the vegetable de-
partment to obtain the avocado she ob-
served no employees or customers in the 
vegetable department and when asked if 
there was anything to distract her she an-
swered "No." When asked if there was 
anything to prevent her from seeing the 
lettuce leaves on the floor if she had 
looked she answered that she was not look-
ing on the floor at the time but said there 
was nothing to prevent her from seeing the 
lettuce leaves on the floor had she looked. 
The manager of the store testified that be-
tween fifteen and thirty minutes before he 
learned of Mrs. O'Dell's fall he was in the 
vegetable area for the purpose of helping 
customers and checking supplies. He said 
he would have checked to see whether or 
not there was any debris on the floor. It 
was one of his responsibilities to look after 
the aisles. He was told by one of the 
clerks that Mrs. O'Dell had fallen and ht 
went to where she had fallen and said h< 
looked at the floor and saw nothing. 
The cause was submitted to the jury o* 
the alleged ground that defendant failed t< 
use ordinary care to remove the wet let 
tuce or cabbage leaves on the floor after i 
knew or could have known of the unsaf 
condition and that Mrs. O'Dell did nc 
know and could not have known of the ur 
safe condition of the floor. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial cou 
erred in setting aside the jury verdict : 
favor of the plaintiffs and entering a judf 
ment in favor of the defendant because tf 
evidence shows that defendant had eith« 
Cite as 432 S. 
ctual or constructive notice of the condi-
tion of the floor and was negligent in per-
mitting the wet leaves to remain on the 
floor for a period of thirty minutes and 
further contends that Mrs. O'Dell was not 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
• failing to remember the presence of the 
leaves on the floor, which she had pre-
viously observed thirty minutes prior there-
to. Defendant contends that her knowl-
edge of the condition of the floor and her 
conduct in failing to avoid it constitutes 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
h 
[1-.3] Defendant admits that Mrs. 
O'Dell was an invitee who was injured on 
its premises. The Supreme Court in the 
case of Harbourn v. Katz Drug Company, 
Mo., 318 S.W.2d 226, 74 A.L.R.2d 938 has 
given the applicable rule governing liability 
to an invitee. It said (I.e. 228, 229): 
' "* * * the rule as to defendants' duty 
, » and liability to one in such status (invi-
•r t tee), as stated in 2 Restatement, Law of 
^ Torts, § 343, is as follows: 'A possessor 
H. of land is subject to liability for bodily 
ft, harm caused to business visitors by a 
s'j% natural or artificial condition thereon if, 
^ but only if, he (a) knows, or by the ex-
^ v ercise of reasonable care could discover, 
| jx the condition which, if known to him, he 
Ij^should realize as involving an unreasona-
jj&j{ble risk to them, and (b) has no reason 
g ^ t p believe that they will discover the 
^cond i t ion or realize the risk involved 
^therein, and (c) invites or permits them 
Ipto remain upon the land without exercis-
^ing reasonable care (i) to make the con-
edition reasonably safe, or (ii) to give a 
gnvarning adequate to enable them to 
^avoid the harm * * *. '" 
pUie basis of defendant's liability is its su-
lor knowledge of an unreasonable risk 
| Jna rm of which the invitee, in the exer-
iJp* of ordinary care, does not or should 
ESC^ow. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Com-
t> supra, I.e. 229. However, in order 
^defendant to fulfill its duty to plaintiff 
I*11 invitee it need not make repeated 
«32 S.W.2d—25 
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warnings. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Com-
pany, supra, I.e. 231. 
[4-6] Also, defendant had only the al-
ternate duty either to remove the wet 
leaves that created the dangerous condition 
or to warn Mrs. O'Dell of the dangerous 
condition that existed on the floor. De-
fendant did not have the duty to both re-
move the leaves from the floor and to 
warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition. 
If defendant warned plaintiff of the condi-
tion or if plaintiff had the same knowledge 
of the condition as defendant there would 
be no liability on the part of defendant. 
Liability of an owner or occupant of prem-
ises is predicated on the owner or proprie-
tor's superior knowledge of the dangerous 
condition and the danger therefrom to per-
sons going upon the premises. It is only 
when the dangerous condition is known to 
the owner or occupant of the premises and 
not known to the person injured, that a re-
covery is permitted. It follows therefore 
that there is no liability by the owner or 
occupier of the premises for injuries from 
dangers that are obvious, or as well known 
to the person injured as to the owner or oc-
cupant. Lamberton v. Fish, Mo., 148 S.W. 
2d 544,1. c. 546. 
[7] In the instant case Mrs. O'Dell on 
her first trip past the vegetable counter 
thirty minutes before she fell saw that the 
floor was wet and that it had debris which 
she described as either lettuce or cabbage 
leaves on it. She said it covered an area 
of one square foot; her mother warned 
her to " 'be careful,'" telling her, " 'it looks 
kind of messy in there. '" Mrs. O'Dell did 
not deny that her mother warned her, she 
merely testified that she did not remember 
her mother saying anything to her. State 
ex rel. and to Use of Williams v. Feld 
Chevrolet, Inc., Mo.App., 403 S.W.2d 672, 
683. The fact is that Mrs. O'Dell did ad-
mit that she saw the wet leaves on the 
floor and was fully aware of the danger-
ous condition of the floor at that time. 
While the evidence in this case does not 
show that defendant warned Mrs. O'Dell 
d o u 
of the condition of the floor, nevertheless, 
defendant is not liable for failure to warn 
Mrs. O'Dell because it was shown that 
Mrs. O'Dell had knowledge of the danger-
ous condition of the floor. She saw its 
dangerous condition thirty minutes before 
she fell. The source of the knowledge of 
Mrs. O'Dell is immaterial. The important 
fact is that she had as much knowledge of 
the condition as defendant had or was 
charged with. Trautloff v. Dannen Mills, 
Inc., Mo.App., 316 S.W.2d 866, 871. The 
lighting conditions were good; there were 
no customers in the vegetable department 
at the time Mrs. O'Dell fell and there was 
nothing to prevent her from seeing an ob-
viously dangerous condition which she had 
observed thirty minutes earlier. Mrs. 
O'Dell was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law. 
However, Mrs. O'Dell seeks to escape 
the accusatory nature and effect of this 
knowledge by stating in her brief that she 
failed to remember the presence of the 
leaves on the floor when she returned to 
get the avocado thirty minutes later. 
[8,9] The fact is that Mrs. O'Dell nev-
er did testify that she failed to remember or 
forgot about the presence of the leaves on 
the floor. No such testimony was ever 
given by her; but assuming, without so 
stating, that Mrs. O'Dell did forget, the 
rule of law in this state is that forgetful-
ness, when nothing has occurred to distract 
the mind, does not excuse. Clark v. Mis-
souri Natural Gas Co., Mo., 251 S.W.2d 27, 
I.e. 30. In the case of Harbourn v. Katz 
Drug Co., supra, at page 231, the Supreme 
Court said: "It is unquestionably correct, 
and properly so, that generally an invitee 
who is aware of a dangerous condition 
cannot impose liability on the possessor of 
property because he momentarily forgot 
about it and was injured. Lamberton v. 
Fish, supra; 38 Amjur. , Negligence, § 
187; Annotation, 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 896." 
The court further said: "'Circumstances 
may exist under which forgetfulness or in-
attention to a known danger may be con-
sistent with tne CACI^-V . 
as where the situation requires one to give 
undivided attention to other matters, or is 
such as to produce hurry or confusion, or 
where conditions arise suddenly which are 
calculated to divert one's attention momen-
tarily from the danger.' 65 C.J.S. Negli-
gence § 120, pp. 726-727." 
Were the circumstances in this case suf-
ficient to excuse Mrs. O'Dell's forgetful-
ness, if in fact she did forget? She did 
not testify that she was in a hurry, nor 
was there anything to show that a condi-
tion arose suddenly which was calculated 
to divert her attention. She did not say 
that she was unaware of the location of 
the avocadoes. She did not say that she 
was focusing her attention on the vegetable 
stand. She did testify that there were no 
customers in the vegetable department at 
.that time and that there was nothing to 
distract her and that she could have seen 
this condition on the floor, which was one 
foot square in area, had she looked. We 
find nothing in the evidence that was cal-
culated to divert Mrs. O'Dell's attention 
from the obviously dangerous condition of 
the floor. No circumstances were shown 
to exist which would excuse her forgetful-
ness or inattention to the danger confront-
ing her. Plaintiffs cite the case of Stocker 
v. J. C. Penney Co., Mo.App., 338 S.W.2d 
339 in support of their position. The facts 
in that case may be distinguished from the 
facts of the instant case. In that case 
plaintiff saw a small dark object about the 
size of a plum as she was descending the 
steps of the store on the first trip dowr 
the steps and after a considerable shoppin' 
tour of the store that lasted approximate! 
one hour and a half, she again descende 
the same steps and stepped in and wc 
caused to fall by the deposit of gum on tr 
stairway which had been on said step fc 
at least one hour and a half. In t! 
Stocker case plaintiff testified that si 
was not thinking of the spot as she c 
scended the steps, stating that it had, "ji 
slipped my mind." We upheld the juc 
ment in favor of plaintiff pointing out ti 
the defect or condition was not of sucl 
Cite as 432 
striking nature as would likely produce a 
lasting effect upon the mmd of one observ-
ing !t- ^n ^ e m s t a n t c a s e ^ e condition 
that caused Mrs O'Dell's fall was a glar-
ingly dangerous condition. A much short-
er period of time elapsed between the time 
Mrs O'Dell saw it and the time of her fall 
than existed m the Stocker case. Also 
Mrs O'Dell testified that she was not dis-
tracted. 
We rule the trial court was correct in 
directing a judgment for the defendant. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed 
ANDERSON, P J , and JAMES H. 
KEET, J r , Special Judge, concur. 
BURGDORFER ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, 
v. 
VOYLES CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent, 
and 
Henry B. Classe and Helma Classe, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Nos. 32844, 32845. 
St. Louis Court of Appeals. 
Missouri 
Sept 17, 1968 
*% Action for mechanic's hen. 
»* 
The Cir-
cuit Court, City of St. Louis County, Wil-
Kam E. Buder, J., entered judgment for 
Pontiff and defendant appealed. The 
^cmrt of Appeals, Clemens, C , held that 
^contractor could rely on builder's testimony 
jh*t builder agreed to pay contractor $7,-
^ , t o wire 14 apartment units to establish 
fitfact price although that price differed 
IS0* contractor's testimony that original 
w * 4 . w ^ w v . MO. 3 # 7 
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agreement was for 12 units for $6,500 with 
tentative plans for two additional units 
where contractor's petition was based on 
contract and sought money judgment and 
mechanic's hen of $8,003 09 for work and 
materials furnished at builder's request, 
without specifying any number of units. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Evidence ©=592 
Rule that a party is entitled to all evi-
dence in case favorable to his position is 
subject to qualification that evidence intro-
duced by other party cannot be used if it 
contradicts party's own evidence or is con-
trary to his theory. 
2. Mechanics, Liens <S=28I(I) 
Contractor could rely on builder's tes-
timony that builder agreed to pay contrac-
tor $7,525 to wire 14 apartment units to es-
tablish contract price although that price 
differed from contractor's testimony that 
original agreement was for 12 units for 
$6,500 with tentative plans for two addi-
tional units where contractor's petition was 
based on contract and sought money judg-
ment and mechanic's lien of $8,003 09 for 
work and materials furnished at builder's 
request, without specifying any number of 
units. 
3. Mechanics' Liens <§=>288(l) 
Evidence, in mechanic's hen action, 
was sufficient for jury, on basis of build-
er's testimony, to find that builder had 
promised to pay contractor $7,525 to wire 
14 apartment units even though contractor 
testified that original agreement was for 
12 units for $6,550 with tentative plans for 
two additional units. 
4. Trial <£=>I09 
Verdict should be directed against 
plaintiff when his opening statement con-
tains admissions precluding his recovery. 
5. Evidence C=207(2) 
Plaintiff's opening statement that he 
had a different recollection about initial 
§ 2 9 0 TORTS, SECOND Ch. 12 
the enactment, no matter how actually excusable, does not pro-
tect him from liability for any harm caused by its violation to 
an interest which the enactment is designed to protect. This 
is true although the enactment establishes a standard of conduct 
which is in direct contradiction to that customarily regarded as 
necessary. The same is true when a course of judicial decision 
has fixed a standard different from that which had been pre-
viously regarded as sufficient. Not only must the actor know 
the statutory and common law, in so far as it establishes a 
standard of obligatory behavior, at the risk of incurring liability 
if he falls below it, but he must also know such law in so far as 
obedience to it is likely to determine the conduct of others. 
In the absence of some reason to know that others habitually 
violate such standards, or that a particular person is about to do 
so, he should expect them to be obeyed and regulate his conduct 
accordingly. 
Illustration: 
7. An ordinance of the city of X requires trolley cars 
to stop at the near side of every boulevard crossing. A is 
driving an automobile along an intersecting street. He is 
about to pass between a trolley car and the curb. The car 
is approaching a boulevard crossing but gives no evidence 
of its purpose to stop. A speeds up to pass. The car stops 
and a passenger, B, alights. A's automobile is then going so 
fast that when he sees the car about to stop he is unable 
to stop his automobile in time to avoid running over B. Ir-
respective of whether A knows of the ordinance or resides 
in X, he is negligent, since he is charged with knowledge of 
the ordinance and should expect the car to stop, unless there 
is some particular reason to believe that the motorman does 
not intend to obey the ordinance. 
§ 2 9 1 . Unreasonableness; How Determined; Magnitude of 
Risk and Utility of Conduct 
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would 
recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk 
is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of 
such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as 
the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which 
it is done. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
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Comment: 
a. The problem involved may be expressed in homely terms 
by asking whether "the game is worth the candle/' 
6. Burden of proof. Conduct is not negligent unless the 
magnitude of the risk involved therein so outweighs its utility as 
to make the risk unreasonable. Therefore, one relying upon 
negligence as a cause of action or defense must convince the 
court and jury that this is the case. 
c. Standardized judgment In determining whether the 
actor should realize the unreasonable character of a known or 
recognizable risk, the judgment of the actor, unless he be a child, 
must conform to the standard of a reasonable man, neither more 
nor less. He is not excused because he is peculiarly inconsiderate 
of others or reckless of his own safety, nor is he negligent if his 
moral or social conscience is so sensitive that he regards as im-
proper conduct which a reasonable man would regard as proper. 
In this respect the problem differs somewhat from that of deter-
mining whether the actor should recognize the risk which his 
conduct involves and its magnitude, in which allowance is made 
for certain physical infirmities and in which the actor is required 
to utilize such superior qualities as he may possess. As to the 
standard to which the judgment of a child must conform, see 
§283 A. 
d. Weighing risk against utility of conduct which creates 
it. The magnitude of the risk is to be compared with what the 
law regards as the utility of the act. If legal and popular opinion 
differ, it is the legal opinion which prevails. The point upon 
which there is likely to be such divergence between the two is 
usually in respect to the social value of the respective interests 
concerned. If the legal valuation differs from that attached to the 
respective interests by a persistent and long-continued course of 
public conviction, as distinguished from a novel and possibly 
ephemeral opinion, courts should and often do re-examine their 
.valuation and make it conform to the settled popular opinion. 
^ In so far as the legal valuation depends upon the settled public 
^conviction at the time and place, there is often a necessary dif-
ference of decision on a particular question, not only between 
* England and America, but even between different States of the 
yjnited States. 
ph e. The law attaches utility to general types or classes of acts 
.as appropriate to the advancement of certain interests rather than 
sto the purpose for which a particular act is done, except in the 
9— Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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case in which the purpose is of itself of such public utility as to 
justify an otherwise impermissible risk. Thus, the law regards 
the free use of the highway for travel as of sufficient utility to 
outweigh the risk of carefully conducted traffic, and does not ordi-
narily concern itself with the good, bad, or indifferent purpose 
of a particular journey. It may, however, permit a particular 
method of travel which is normally not permitted if it is neces-
sary to protect some interest to which the law attaches a pre-
eminent value, as where the legal rate of speed is exceeded in the 
pursuit of a felon or in conveying a desperately wounded patient 
to a hospital. 
/ . Misfeasance and non-feasance. An act is negligent if 
the risk involved in it outweighs its utility. On the other hand, 
it is not enough to create a duty to take positive action for the 
protection of another that the burden of giving the protection 
is out of all proportion small as compared to other's need there-
of. (See § 314, Comment c.) Some relationship between the 
parties or some precedent action is necessary to create such a 
duty, and duties of positive action are not imposed except under 
circumstances in which normally the benefit to the other out-
weighs the burden to the actor. (See §§ 314-324 A.) Even 
where the relationship or precedent act is one which usually 
creates a duty of protective action, no such duty exists if the 
benefit to the other is less than, or merely equal to, the utility 
of action or inaction to the actor. 
g. There is rarely an absolute duty to secure the other's 
protection. The duty is usually to take reasonable care to give 
protection. As in all cases where reasonable conduct is involved, 
the reasonable character of the care depends upon whether the 
interference with the actor's own affairs is warranted by the 
other's danger. 
§ 2 9 2 * Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's 
Conduct 
In determining what the law regards as the utility of 
the actor's conduct for the purpose of determining 
whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are 
important: 
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the 
interest which is to be advanced or protected by the 
conduct; 
See Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will 
be advanced or protected by the particular course of 
conduct; 
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can 
be adequately advanced or protected by another and less 
dangerous course of conduct. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment on Clause (a ) : 
a. Legal valuation of actor's interests. The most im-
portant factor in determining the utility of the actor's conduct 
is the value which the law attaches to the interest which the 
conduct is intended and appropriate to advance or protect. The 
interest may be exclusively public, as in the case of the appre-
hension of an actual or reasonably supposed criminal. It may 
be a purely private interest of the actor or a third person. It may 
be an interest which is primarily of private advantage, but the 
'public may nonetheless be interested, not merely as the pro-
tector of the private interest, but also because the general public 
good is advanced by the protection and advancement of such 
private interests. Thus, the idea that the interest of the public 
as a group can best be served by permitting the utmost freedom 
"of individual initiative is inherent in both legal and popular 
thought. The irreducible minimum of risk both to employees 
[and outsiders which is inherent in manufacture is not regarded 
fas unreasonable, not so much because manufacture is profitable 
tto those who carry it on, but because it is believed that the whole 
^community benefits by it. The operation of railways and other 
fpublic utilities, no matter how carefully carried on, produces 
^accidents which kill or harm many people but the risk involved 
un the operation is more than counterbalanced by the service 
jjrhich they render the public. 
i r 6. Deviation from popular valuation of interests. It is the 
value which the law attaches to the interest which is decisive of 
the utility of conduct which serves it. The value attached by the 
Daw to the great majority of interests is identical with the value 
(which popular opinion attaches to them. There are, however, 
interests to which a persistent course of decisions has, expressly 
f>v by implication, attached a value different from that which 
|he jury would ordinarily attach thereto. In such case, it is the 
1 ? ^ an(* n o t the popular valuation which is controlling. 
M— Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
57 
§ 292 Tui I'^ SKCOM) Ck 12 
Comment on Clause •; 
c. Alternative opj. -ir-u-
 t v advance his interest. 
If the actor can advance or protect his interest as adequately by 
other conduct which involves less risk of harm to others, the risk 
contained in his conduct is clearly unreasonable. If any o^her 
practicable course of conduct is clearly likely to give his interest 
a less adequate advancement or protection the question whether 
the risk is or is not unreasonable depends upon whether the 
additional risk involved in the particular course of conduct out-
weighs the additional advancement or protection which it is 
likely to secure. In determining whether an actor has acted 
reasonably in pursuing a particular course of conduct rather than 
another and less dangerous course, account is also taken of the 
fact that he was acting in an emergency which required him to 
make an immediate decision (see ? 296), 
§ 2 9 3 . Factors Magnitude u. 
Risk 
In determining ine magnitude .-• *:•*- nsk fo* the pur-
pose of determining whether the actor is negligent, the 
following factors are important: 
(a) the social value which the law attache^ to the 
interests which are imperiled; 
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's con-
duct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other 
or of one of a class of which the other is a member; 
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the 
interests imperiled; 
(d I the number of persons whose interests are J; -
to be invaded if lh<» risk takes effect in harm. 
S«*e Reporter's Notes. 
Comment on daube ;**;;. 
a. As the social value of the interest imperiled increases, 
the magnitude of the risk which is justified diminishes. Con-
duct which would be unreasonable if it created a risk of harm 
to life or limb might be justified if it should imperil only some 
property interest of merely dignitary or slight tangible value. 
See Appendix for ^ p o r t e r ' s Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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Henry MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ASHLAND CHEMICAL, INC., 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Henry MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ASHLAND CHEMICAL, INC., et 
aL, Defendants, 
and 
Ozone Waters, Inc. and Ebco Manufac-
turing Co., Defendants-Appellee. 
Nos. 82-3303, 82-3521, 82-3531 
and 82-3598 
Summary Calendar 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
April 25, 1983. 
In a Louisiana diversity action, plain-
tiff sought damages from several defend-
ants for personal injuries sustained in a 
propane gas explosion on premises of one of 
the defendants. Appeals brought by plain-
tiff from dismissal of his claims against 
some of the defendants by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana at New Orleans, Adrian 
G. Duplantier, J., were consolidated. The 
Court of Appeals, Tate, Circuit Judge, held 
that: (1) it could not be said as matter of 
law, under Louisiana law, that defendant 
did not create unreasonable risk of injury to 
plaintiff worker by placing its gas contain-
ers to be filled by him adjacent to water 
cooler that would emit sparks when motor 
.clicked on as plaintiff filled container with 
flammable gas, and issue as to whether 
^defendant knew or should have known that 
Jts conduct created such risk and whether 
.risk so created was unreasonable were is-
sues for trier of fact, but (2) as matter of 
paw, under Louisiana law, such alleged de-
fect in water cooler did not constitute de-
fect or create unreasonable risk of injury to 
[others. 
pJ* Affirmed in part, reversed and remand-
W in part, and dismissed in part. 
ND CHEMICAL, INC. 921 
1921 (1983) 
1. Federal Courts <®=»600 
Where although fewer than all claims 
were decided in federal district court the 
judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim 
against one defendant was not entered with 
certification required, dismissal of appeal 
without prejudice, as premature, was re-
quired. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 54(b), 28 
U.S.OA. 
2. Negligence <s=>121.1(6) 
Under law of Louisiana, whether liabil-
ity is sought to be imposed on defendant by 
reason either of negligence or of strict lia-
bility under statute, injured plaintiff is re-
quired to prove that risk from which his 
damage resulted was an unreasonable risk 
of harm. LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322. 
3. Negligence <s=»22 
Under Louisiana law, determination 
whether defendant has created or main-
tained unreasonable risk of harm to another 
involves balancing whether risk is of such 
magnitude as to outweigh what law regards 
as social utility of defendant's conduct, 
premises or thing or manner in which de-
fendant's conduct is done or his premises 
maintained or his thing manufactured, 
whether defendant is sought to be held 
liable for his negligence under Louisiana 
strict liability theories. LSA-C.C. arts. 
2316, 2317, 2322. 
4. Negligence <§=»22 
Under Louisiana law, in determining 
whether defendant has created or main-
tained unreasonable risk of harm to anoth-
er, ease of association of plaintiffs injury 
with rule relied upon, upon which defend-
ant's liability is sought to be based, is al-
ways proper consideration. LSA-C.C. arts. 
2316, 2317, 2322. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure @=>2515 
Issues that require determination of 
reasonableness of acts and conduct of par-
ties under all facts and circumstances of 
case cannot ordinarily be disposed of by 
summary judgment. LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 
2317, 2322. 
A 4 
6. Negligence ®=>136(18) 
It could not be said as niatter of law, 
under Louisiana law, that defendant did not 
create unreasonable risk of injury to plain-
tiff worker by placing propane gas contain-
ers to be filled by him adjacent to water 
cooler that would emit sparks when motor 
clicked on, thus creating foreseeable hazard 
of gas explosion injuring plaintiff while, as 
expected, he filled container with flamma-
ble gas, and issues as to whether defendant 
knew or should have known that its conduct 
created such risk and whether risk so creat-
ed was unreasonable were issues for trier of 
fact LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322. 
7, Negligence ®=»20 
As matter of law, under Louisiana law, 
alleged defect in defendant's water cooler 
in that it emitted electric sparks when mo-
tor clicked on did not constitute defect or 
create unreasonable risk of injury to others, 
there being no permissible inference that 
defendant water cooler manufacturer, dis-
tinguishable from plaintiff's actual or pre-
sumed knowledge, should reasonably have 
anticipated foreseeable use of water cooler 
in dangerous proximity to flammable gas. 
LSA-C.C. arts. 2316, 2317, 2322. 
Ri i -in, New Orleans, La., I hilip 
\ G Gretna, La., for plaintiff-appel-
lant 
• Jones, "W alker, W aechter, Poitevent, 
Carrere & Dengre, John J. Weigel, New 
Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees 
John H. Musser, IV, New Orleans, La , 
for Ozone Waters. 
Camp, Carmouche, Palmer, Barsh & 
Hunter, Donald A. Hoffman, New Orleans, 
I a for Ebco Mfg. Co. 
Appeals from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
Before GEE, RANDALL and TATE, Cir-
cuit Judges 
TATE, Circuit Judge: 
In this Louisiana diversity action, the 
plaintiff Matthews seeks damages from 
several defendants for personal injuries he 
sustained in a propane gas explosion on the 
premises of Ashland Chemical, one of the 
defendants. These four consolidated ap-
peals are brought by Matthews from the 
i -n-issal of his claims against some of the 
; ir'-unts. His claims against other de-
"'^ are still pending below. 
.Matthews, a propane gas delivery man, 
was filling a gas cylinder left out for him 
on the loading dock of the defendant Ash-
land, a customer. For purposes of summa-
ry judgment, the explosion occurred be-
cause of an electrical spark emitted from 
the motor of a water cooler near the cylin-
der. Ashland was the custodian or owner 
of the premises and of both water cooler 
and cylinder and had placed the latter in 
proximity to one another. The water cooler 
had been manufactured by the defendant-
appellee Ebco and had been leased to Ash-
land by the defendant-appellee Ozone. 
[1] Initially, we note that, although 
claims are still pending below, the judg-
ment dismissing the plaintiff Matthews' 
claim against Ozone (Supp.Rec, document 
132) was not entered with the certification 
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) when fewer 
than all claims are decided, so this appeal 
(our appeal No. 82-3521) must be dismissed 
without prejudice as premature. The ap-
peals as to the dismissals against Ashland 
and Ebco are, however, properly before us, 
since so certified and directed for entry. 
For reasons more fully set forth below, 
we find that a disputed factual issue is 
presented as to whether Ashland had creat-
ed an unreasonable risk of harm to others, 
so as to be liable under Louisiana negli-
gence or strict liability theories, and that 
therefore summary judgment was improvi-
dently granted in favor of this defendant 
(our appeals No. 82-3303 and No. 82-3598). 
However, we also find that the district 
court did not err as a matter of law in 
holding that, under the facts presented, 
there was no defect in the spark-causing 
water cooler that would subject its manu-
facturer Ebco (our appeal No. 82-3521) ^ to 
Louisiana negligence or products liability 
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recovery, and we therefore affirm the sum-
mary judgments dismissing Matthews* 
claim as against this defendant. 
I. 
Resolving all factual inferences in favor 
of Matthews, and construing the facts 
shown most favorably to him as the non-
moving party in a summary judgment de-
termination, Impossible Electronics Tech-
niques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys-
tems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 
1982), the accident occurred when Mat-
thews, a propane gas route delivery sales-
man for Amoco Oil Company, was filling a 
propane gas cylinder (used to power fork-
lifts) in a warehouse leased and operated by 
Ashland. The empty cylinder (one of three) 
had been left by Ashland for filling at a 
place within the warehouse immediately ad-
jacent to a water cooler (manufactured by 
Ebco and leased to Ashland by Ozone, a 
supplier of spring water). After properly 
connecting the hose to the first cylinder, 
Matthews got a drink of water from the 
water cooler. A moment later, the water 
cooler made a clicking sound which was 
immediately followed by the explosion 
which caused the plaintiff's injuries.1 
I At least for summary judgment purposes, 
it must be accepted that the probable cause 
of the explosion was a spark generated by 
the electrical motor of the water cooler 
when it kicked on. Although the district 
court made no express finding to this effect 
or against it, deposition testimony in the 
record supports this causation. In dismiss-
ing Matthews' claims against the water 
cooler defendants (Ebco and Ozone), the 
district court itself noted that "all motors 
throw sparks" but that nevertheless the 
!• We note that certain facts, potentially materi-
al m a trial on the merits, are in controversy; 
for example, the defendant contends (I) that 
the cylinders weighed, at most, seventy pounds 
when filled, and could have been easily moved 
to be safely filled outside the warehouse (this is 
denied by the plaintiff), (2) that the gas escaped 
because of a faulty nozzle connection or the 
carelessness of the plaintiff (denied by the 
plaintiff), (3) that the water cooler functioned 
normally before and after the accident and was 
free of all defects (denied by the plaintiff who 
water cooler motor was not defective "by 
virtue of [its] emitting sparks." 
In granting summary judgment to Ash-
land, the district court found that the above 
undisputed facts presented no factual issue 
and indisputably showed that Ashland had 
not failed to use reasonable care in placing 
the empty gas cylinder next to the water 
cooler; and it further found no basis for 
Louisiana strict liability as custodian or 
premise-owner in Ashland's placing non-de-
fective empty propane cylinders near a non-
defective electric water cooler with the ex-
pectation that Matthews would fill them 
with explosive propane gas. In granting 
summary judgment to the water cooler de-
fendants (Ebco and Ozone), the district 
court found that the water cooler "was not 
defective by virtue of emitting sparks or an 
arc" and that these defendants "had no 
duty to warn Matthews that the compressor 
may emit sparks and should not be used 
around flammable gases." 
It should be noted that the narrow issue 
presented by these appeals concerns only 
whether the district court erred in holding 
that the defendants' conduct or equipment 
did not subject them to liability under Loui-
siana negligence or strict liability theories. 
The district court did not reach the issue of 
whether the plaintiff Matthews himself 
might be barred from recovery by his con-
tributory negligence or assumption of the 
risk, and we do not reach that issue for that 
reason. (Further conflicting factual show-
ings in the record before us make summary 
judgment inappropriate for resolution of 
that issue by us on appeal.) Thus, in a 
sense, the issue before us on appeal for 
summary judgment purposes concerns the 
defendants' liability independent of Mat-
now argues that the accident occurred when an 
unsealed thermostatic switch within the water 
cooler generated a spark, in turning its com-
pressor off or on, which ignited the propane 
gas), and (4) that filling the cylinder within an 
enclosed space or near a motor was contrary to 
safety practices of the plaintiffs employer, 
Amoco Oil Company (denied by the plaintiff); 
and, finally, (5) the parties also differ in their 
estimates of the distances separating the water 
cooler from the propane cylinder. 
thews' individual conduct or expertise, 
somewhat as if an innocent bystander in-
stead of the experienced Matthews had 
been injured by the explosion. CY., Brown-
lee v. Louisville Varnish Company, 641 F.2d 
397, 401 (5th Cir.1981). 
II. 
The issues thus posed by these appeals 
may be stated as follows: As to Ashland: 
Is this defendant at actionable fault, either 
because negligent, La.Civ.C. art. 2316, or by 
virtue of its strict liability as the custodian 
of things, La.Civ.C art. 2317, or owner of 
premises, La.Civ.C. art. 2322, because it 
placed gas cylinders for filling next to a 
water cooler that emitted sparks when the 
motor clicked on, because of actual or pre-
sumed knowledge of that latter fact and of 
the further circumstance that Matthews 
would fill those cylinders as placed by Ash-
land2 with flammable propane gas that 
would explode if a spark emitted during the 
filling? As to Ebco: Did the characteristics 
of the water cooler of emitting electrical 
sparks when its motor kicked on constitute 
a defect so as to implicate liability under 
Louisiana negligence or products strict lia-
bility theories? 
[2] Central in law and fact to the deci • 
sion of these issues is whether, as to each 
defendant, its conduct or equipment created 
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. In 
its recent decision in Entrevia v. Hood, 427 
So.2d 1146 (La.1983), the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana made plain that, whether liability 
2 rhe plaintiff Matthews* discovery deposition, 
indicates that an Ashland employee would 
place the cylinders on Ashland's loading plat-
form and await Matthews' arrival and that he 
always filled them as placed. Dep., pp. 50-53, 
56-57. This is a controverted issue, however. 
it**n 11., d i-hiei difference is th.it 
1<
 i-nu^r in re£h£pnce the dr 
but that the 
whether the risk 
differ for negligence or stn 
So.2d at 1150. To same effect, , .,.
 :, 
Stores, Inc., 387 So.2d 585 (La. 1980). 
is sought to be imposed on a defendant by 
reason either of negligence or of its strict 
liability under La.Civ.C. arts. 2317, 2322,3 an 
injured plaintiff is required to prove that 
"the risk from which his damage resulted 
posed an unreasonable risk of harm." 427 
So.2d at 1149. 
[3] Entrevia notes that the determina-
tion of whether the defendant has created 
oi maintained an unreasonable risk of harm 
is determined on the basis of "a balancing 
of claims and interests, a weighing of the 
risk and the gravity of harm, and a consid-
eration of individual and societal rights arid 
obligations," 427 So.2d at 1149, weighing 
the "magnitude of the risk and the gravity 
of the harm threatened", 427 So.2d at 
1149, a weighing that calls upon the judge 
"to decide questions of social utility that 
require him to consider the particular case 
in terms of moral, social and economic con-
siderations", 427 So.2d at 1149. As Entre-
via indicates, the judge's duty in determin-
ing whether the defendant has created an 
unreasonable risk of harm in part partakes 
of a determination of law ("it is necessary 
for the judge, in shaping his decision about 
how the law applies to the facts, to consider 
the particular situation from the same 
standpoint as would a legislator regulating 
the matter", 427 So.2d at 1149,4 as well as 
a determination of fact as to whether the 
defendant's conduct or thing created an un-
reasonable risk of harm in the particular-
ized situation presented for decision. See 
Andrus v. Trailers Unlimited, 647 F.2d 556 
4, In Andrus v. Trailers Unlimited, 647 F.2d 556, 
559 (5th Cir.1981), in analyzing the Louisiana 
jurisprudence with regard to the determination 
of whether a risk of injury falls within 'the 
ambit of the duty owned by the defendant, we 
noted that "[i]t is, therefore, an inherently judi-
cial function to say whether there is any legal 
principle to cover the risk of injury sustained 
by the plaintiff." The Andrus court ultimately 
held that an issue of fact precluding a directed 
verdict was presented as to whether the de-
fendant breached its duty under the particular 
ized facts presented, having noted that 'the 
court determines whether the risks should fall 
within the scope of the defendant's duty, but 
that the trier of fact (the jury, there) deter-
mines whether the defendant's conduct foresee-
ably had violated such duty. 647 F.2d at 559. 
MA1TUEWS v. ASHLAND CHEMICAL, INC. 
Cite as 703 F.2d 921 (1983) 
(5th Cir.1981), for analysis of prior Louisi- against Ebco, the manufacturer 
ana jurisprudence to the same effect. 
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[4] In accord with prior Louisiana ju-
risprudence, Entrevia thus illustrates that 
the determination of whether the defendant 
has created or maintained an unreasonable 
risk of harm to another involves a balancing 
of whether the risk is of such magnitude5 
as to outweigh what the law regards as the 
social utility6 of the defendant's conduct, 
premises, or thing or the manner in which 
the defendant's conduct is done or his prem-
ises maintained or his thing manufactured, 
whether the defendant is sought to be held 
liable for his negligence, Hebert v. Gulf 
States Utilities Company, 426 So.2d 111 (La. 
1983); Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 
La. 542,256 So.2d 620 (1972), or under Loui-
siana strict liability theories, Olsen v. Shell 
Oil Co., 365 So.2d 1285 (La.1978); Loescher 
v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441 (La.1975); Weber v. 
Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 
250 So.2d 754 (1971). Further, "the ease of 
association of the [plaintiff's] injury with 
the rule relied upon [upon which the de-
fendant's liability is sought to be based] . . . 
is always a proper consideration." Hill v. 
Lundin & Associates, supra, 260 La. at 549, 
P p 256 So.2d at 622; Andrus v. Trailers Unlim-
* f~ ited, supra, 647 F.2d at 560. 
III. 
, r Tested in the light of these principles, we 
find for reasons to be stated that the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiff Matthews' claim 
Cf. Restatement 2d of Torts § 293 (1965): 
* Factors Considered in Determining Magni-
tude of Risk 
In determining the magnitude of the risk for 
the purpose of determining whether the actor 
is negligent, the following factors are impor-
vtant: 
(a) the social value which the law attaches 
to the interests which are imperiled; 
(b) the extent of the chance that the ac-
tor's conduct will cause an invasion of any 
interest of the other or of one of a class of 
which the other is a member; 
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be 
caused to the interests imperiled; 
(d) the number of persons whose interests 
are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect 
in harm. 
of the 
water cooler, should be affirmed, but that 
disputed issues or inferences of fact pre-
cluded the entry of summary judgment dis-
missing Matthews' claim against Ashland. 
[5] Summary judgment may be granted 
only where—after considering all factual 
showings and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the opposing party—there is 
"no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the opposing party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56(3); Williams v. Shell Oil Company, 677 
F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir.1982). "A court must 
not decide any factual issues it finds in the 
record, but if such are present, the courts 
must deny the motion and proceed to tri-
a l . . . . [Even] [i]f reasonable minds might 
differ on the inferences arising from undis-
puted facts, then the court should deny 
summary judgment." Impossible Electron-
ics Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protec-
tive Systems, supra, 669 F.2d at 1031. 
Summary judgment is ordinarily (but not 
always) inappropriate when the issue in-
volves negligence or contributory negli-
gence, 10 Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2729 (2d ed. 
1983), since "even where there is no dispute 
as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to 
decide whether the conduct in question 
meets the reasonable man standard." Id., 
at p. 217. Issues that require "the determi-
nation of the reasonableness of the acts and 
conduct of the parties under all the facts 
and circumstances of the case, cannot ordi-
6. Cf Restatement 2d of Torts § 292 (1965): 
Factors Considered in Determining Utility 
of Actor's Conduct 
In determining what the law regards as the 
utility of the actor's conduct for the purpose 
of determining whether the actor is negligent, 
the following factors are important: 
(a) the social value which the law attaches 
to the interest which is to be advanced or 
protected by the conduct; 
(b) the extent of the chance that this inter-
est will be advanced or protected by the 
particular course of conduct; 
(c) the extent of the chance that such in-
terest can be adequately advanced or protect-
ed by another and less dangerous course of 
conduct. 
m 
JS 
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m 
1 
narily be disposed of by summary judg-
ment." Gross v. Southern Railway Compa-
ny, 414 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir 1969). 
\ Ma tth e ws * Claim. Agains t Ashhnd 
[6] Construing the disputed facts most 
favorably to Matthews for purposes of sum-
mary judgment, we cannot say that Ash-
land did not as a matter of law create an 
unreasonable risk of injury to him by plac-
ing its containers to be filled by him adja-
cent to its water cooler that would emit 
sparks when the motor clicked on and thus 
creating a foreseeable hazard of gas explo-
sion injuring Matthews while, as expected, 
he filled the container with flammable gas. 
The magnitude of the risk thus created is 
not clearly outweighed by utility factors, 
and the injury received is closely associated 
with the risk thus created* Whether the 
defendant Ashland knew or should have 
known that its conduct created such risk, 
and whether the risk so created was unrea-
sonable under the particularized facts be-
fore us, are issues that cannot, in our opin-
ion, be decided as a matter of law but must 
be relegated to the trier of fact As we 
recently stated in Owen v. Kerr-McGee Cor-
poration, 698 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir.1983), in 
affirming the defendant's denial of a mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict in favor of a plaintiff injured by the 
defendant's buried gas pipeline: 
Under Louisiana law, the owner and 
operator of a facility must exercise rea-
sonable care for the safety of persons on 
or around his property. Waiter v. Union 
Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So.2d 1043, 1047 (La. 
1979); Dyson v. Gulf Modular Corp., 3$8 
So 2d 1385, 1390-91 (La.1976); Williams 
\ City of Alexandria, 376 So.2d 367, 3?0 
(La.App.1979). In determining a particu-
"'• fondants' duty, consideration should 
*m to the nature of the facility and 
rs presented hv it. Walker, su-
4h-
would be exercised by a reasonable per 
s,.»- r ., ..; position ?> ./ fnrtual question 
i^ieombe v. breath1 us <t- '• -;> J<: llv4f;, 
1349 (La.App.19SH 
(Emphasis added.) 
B Matthews' Claim Against Ebco 
~; Matthews' claim against Ebco, the 
.,..: wiacturer of the water cooler, is based 
on the machine's alleged defect in that it 
emitted electrical sparks when the motor 
clicked on. We find no error in the district 
court's concluding as a matter of law that 
this characteristic of the machine did not 
constitute a defect or create an unreason-
able risk of injury to others. 
In dismissing the claim, the district court 
noted, a permissible inference from, the fac 
tual showings, that "all motors throw 
sparks", and found that Ebco's motor in the 
water cooler previously sold by it to Ozone 
and installed by Ozone on Ashland's premis-
es was not defective simply because it emit-
ted electrical sparks. Implicit in the dis-
trict court's finding was its conclusion that 
the social utility of producing water coolers 
for use in the offices and plants throughout 
the United States—which could not feasibly 
be produced without motors emitting 
sparks—far outweighed any slight risk that 
might result from the not closely associated 
risk and not readily foreseeable use of the 
water cooler in the immediate 'vicinity of 
flammable gas. 
The factual showing negatives and does 
not permit an inference that Ebco, distin-
guishably from Ashland's actual or pre-
sumed knowledge, should reasonably have 
anticipated a foreseeable use, Branch v. 
Chevron International Oil Company, 681 
F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir.1982) (Louisiana prod-
ucts liability law), of its water cooler in 
dangerous proximity to flammable gas, so 
as to constitute either a defect in the ma-
chine (as unreasonably dangerous to normal 
use), Id., or to require Ebco to place a 
A-.-jrr.mg on its machines cautioning against 
•aich use. As stated by the Supreme Court 
•)f Louisiana in holding that under the or-
-LHisumces shown a premise defect was not 
artk-nable, "the magnitude of the risk posed 
and the gravity of the harm threatened 
were small in comparison with that of other 
STEERE TANK LINES, INC. v. I.C.C. 
Cite as 703 F.2d 927 (1983) 
risks presented by things in our society." state-nonradial/two-state-radial 
Entrevia, supra, 427 So.2d at 1150. 
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Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated: 
(1) The appeal of the plaintiff Matthews 
from the dismissal of his claim against 
Ozone, our appeal No. 82-3521, is DIS-
MISSED without prejudice as premature; 
(2) In appeal Nos. 82-3303 and 82-3598, 
the district courts grant of summary judg-
ment dismissing Matthews' claims against 
Ashland is REVERSED, and these claims 
are remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with our opinion; and 
, (3) We AFFIRM the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Ebco in appeal No. 
82-3531, dismissing Matthews' claim as 
against that defendant. 
1
 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED 
AND REMANDED IN PART, AND DIS-
MISSED IN PART. 
STEERE TANK LINES, INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS-
SION and United States of 
America, Respondents. 
No. 82-4309 
Summary Calendar. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
April 25, 1983. 
t^urner, 
Petitioner, joined by intervening peti-
sought review of Interstate Com-
merce Commission order granting interve-
[8?fj certificate of public convenience and 
ijtecessity to operate as common carrier over 
Regula r routes between points in several 
^wates. The Court of Appeals, Tate, Circuit 
held that: (1) carefully drawn four-
authority 
granted to intervenor was not arbitrary or 
capricious and was supported by substantial 
evidence, and (2) intervenor made showing 
adequate to sustain finding of financial fit-
ness. 
Affirmed. 
1. Commerce o=>169, 174 
Review by Court of Appeals of Inter-
state Commerce Commission order granting 
certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity to operate as common carrier is limited 
to determining whether Commission's con-
clusions were arbitrary, capricious, abuse of 
discretion, not in accordance with law or 
unsupported by substantial evidence; if 
Commission's findings are grounded on such 
relevant evidence as reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support conclusion, 
they must be upheld. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2). 
2. Commerce <§=»108 
Review of supporting shipper affidavits 
submitted by petitioner for certificate of 
public convenience and necessity to operate 
as motor common carrier transporting pe-
troleum and petroleum products supported 
conclusion of Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion that petitioner had demonstrated need 
for service throughout substantial portions 
of territory sought, and, when viewed as a 
whole, carefully drawn four-state-nonradi-
al/two-state-radial authority granted was 
not arbitrary or capricious and was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Revised In-
terstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 10101 et seq, 10922(b)(1). 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=»791 
Fact that two different conclusions 
could be drawn from evidence does not pre-
vent agency's finding from being supported 
by substantial evidence. 
4. Commerce <@=>169 
As long as Interstate Commerce Com-
mission considers relevant factors and artic-
ulates rational connection between facts 
found and choice made, decision is not "ar-
bitrary or capricious." 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Cite as 254 N. 
*
An
 Mich 4?c 
M i , by hih iu.%1 . . . t u d , 
:mg. and Ronald Momng, 
i'. ir % \\ Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
\ 
I M'JPII ALFONO, a minor, 1:!' vonne *.-.«-
i in in in in I Vincent Alfono, and Georgettr 
Campbell, d/b/a Campbell Discount Jew-
elry, King Tobacco and Grocery Co., a 
Michigan Corporation, and C hem toy Cor-
poration (formerly Chemical Sundries, 
Inc.), a Foreign Corporation, jointly and 
severally, Defendants-Appellees, 
No, 55669, 
Supreme Court of Michigan, 
June 15, 1977. 
Twelve-year-old boy bi ought negli 
gence action against manufacturer, whole 
saler and retailer of 10 c slingshot seeking 
recovery for loss of sight of an eye which 
was struck by a pellet fired from, a sling-
shot being used by his 11-year-old playmate. 
The Circuit Court, Wayne County, directed 
verdict for defendants, and plaintiffs ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Division I, 
affirmed, and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Levin, J,, held that whether 
manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer, in 
violation of obligation of due care to by-
stander affected by use of product, created 
unreasonable risk of harm in marketing 
slingshots directly to children was a jury 
question. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Fitzgerald, J., dissented with opinhi\ 111 
which Coleman, J.» joined, 
1. Products Liability <s=>22 
: Manufacturers, wholesalers and retail-
ers of manufactured products owe a legal 
obligation of due care to bystanders affect-
ed by use of the products. 
2. Products Liability <fc»88 
p»- Whether manufacturer, wholesaler and 
retailer of 10 <fc slingshot were in violation 
°f obligation of due care to bystander by 
iuurv/iw mien, / a y 
,W.2d 759 
creation of an unreasonable risk of harm in 
marketing slingshot directly to children was 
question for jury. 
3. Negligence <s=» 119(1) 
It obscures the separate issues in negli-
gence case to combine and state them to-
gether m terms of whether there is a duty 
lo refrain from particular conduct. 
Negligence ^>] 
v iigence* is conduct involving an 
< ttm- n<*« of harm. 
M publication Words and Phrases 
t / «ther judicial constructions and 
I f " M O T > 
1 
'p^ss of risk of harm,, wheth-
,ressed in terms of duty, 
r
 the specific standard of 
regarded as issue of law 
r faa i court or the jury to 
iK'ae, L~ . ,ow the utility of the de-
i * iants' conduct is viewed in relation to 
IJU magnitade </ thtr risk. 
Preference for jury resolution of issue 
of negligence is not simply an expedient 
reflecting the difficulty of stating a rule 
that will readily resolve all cases; rather, it 
is rooted in the belief that the jury's judg-
ment of what is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances of a particular case is more 
likely than the judicial judgment to rep-
resent the community's judgment of how 
reasonable persons would conduct them-
selves. 
7. Negligence <e» 136(14 
If experience should be that juries in-
variably reach one result in determining 
standard of care, that may suggest specific 
standard of care upon which all reasonable 
persons would agree; however, until com-
munity judgment is made to appear, the 
principle that doubtful questions regarding 
application of standard of care should be 
decided by reference to community judg-
ment requires jury submission of question 
so in doubt, : 
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8. Negligence G=>1 
Law of negligence was created by com-
mon-law judges and, therefore, it is the 
court's responsibility to continue to develop 
or limit the development of that body of 
law absent legislative directive. 
9. Negligence <s=>l 
Elements of an action for negligence 
are duty, general standard of care, specific 
standard of care, cause in fact, legal or 
proximate cause, and damage. 
10. Negligence <s=>2 
"Duty" comprehends whether defend-
ant is under any obligation to the plaintiff 
to avoid negligent conduct; it does not in-
clude where there is an obligation, the na-
ture of the obligation, the general standard 
of care and the specific standard of care. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Negligence ^ 136(14, 25) 
While court in negligence action de-
cides questions of duty, general standard of 
care and proximate cause, jury decides 
whether there is cause in fact in the specific 
standard of care and whether defendants' 
conduct in particular case is below general 
standard of care, including, unless court is 
of opinion that all reasonable persons would 
agree or there is an overriding legislatively 
or judicially declared public policy, whether 
in the particular case the risk of harm cre-
ated by the defendants' conduct is or is not 
reasonable. 
12. Negligence <s=>2, 56(1.4) 
"Duty" is essentially a question of 
whether the relationship between the actor 
and the injured person gives rise to any 
legal obligation on the actor's part for the 
benefit of the injured person; while proxi-
mate cause encompasses a number of dis-
tinct problems including the limits of liabili-
ty for foreseeable consequences. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
13. Products Liability <s=>6 
A manufacturer owes consumer an ob-
ligation to avoid negligent conduct and the 
obligation extends to persons within 
foreseeable scope of the risk. 
14. Products Liability <s=>88 
Eleven-year-old's shooting pellets 
ward tree with a slingshot and ricochet ii 
12-year-old playmate's eye was within 1 
"recognizable risk of harm" created by m 
keting slingshot directly to children and 1 
ricochet was "a normal consequence of 1 
situation" created by manufacturers, reti 
ers and wholesalers' conduct, thus, creati 
jury question on liability of manufactur 
retailer, and wholesaler. 
15. Negligence <s=>4 
In a negligence case, standard of cc 
duct is reasonable or due care. 
16. Products Liability e=>23 
A person who supplies an article to 
child which may pose a reasonable risk 
harm in the hands of an adult but whi 
poses an unreasonable risk of harm in t 
hands of the child is subject to liability i 
resulting harm under doctrine of neglige 
entrustment. 
17. Products Liability <s=>23 
Doctrine of negligent entrustment 
not limited to plaintiffs whose "individus 
propensities are known to the supplier; dc 
trine also applies to classes of persoi 
18. Negligence <s=>26 
Parent and Child o=>13(l) 
A parent or other responsible adt 
who entrusts a potentially dangerous i 
strumentality to a child may be subject 
liability. 
19. Products Liability <@=>23 
Liability under doctrine of neglige 
entrustment arises from the defendant's a 
of misconduct; he has actually created \ 
unreasonable risk to others by placing 
chattel in the hands of a person whose u 
thereof is likely to create a recognizab 
risk to third persons. 
20. Negligence @=»7 
The obligation to guard or secure o 
jects which are dangerous to children aris 
because of the likelihood of their own i 
Cite as 254' 
ermeddling; persons dealing with children 
nust take notice of the ordinary nature of 
roung boys, their tendency to do mischie-
vous acts, and their propensity to meddle 
vith anything that com.es in their way. 
11. Negligence <s=»39 
The attractive nuisance doctrine, an ex-
eption to the general rule limiting liability 
f landowners for injuries to trespassers, is 
iased on child's inability to appreciate dan-
;er and his inclination to explore without 
egard to the risk. 
2. Negligence =^>39 
Doctrine of attractive nuisan* • *-.s 
.ot depend on the landowner's knowledge 
hat the individual child is incompetent. 
3. Negligence <s=»14 
Doctrine of negligent entrustmein u> 
ot peculiar to automobiles but, rather, an 
rdinary application of general principles 
)r determining whether a person's conduct 
ras reasonable in light of the apparent risk, 
I, Negligence «=>14 
Doctrine of negligent entrustment is 
rounded in general principle that a reason-
ble person will have in mind the immaturi-
rt inexperience and carelessness of chil-
ren. 
5. Products Liability <s»88 
Issue of whether manufacturer, retail-
• and wholesaler of slingshot were subject 
> liability for 12-year-old's loss of sight of 
i eye which was struck by a pellet fired 
'om a slingshot being used by his 11-year-
d playmate could not be taken from jury 
l supposition that an 11-year-old boy 
lows how slingshot operates and, there-
re, appreciates the risk. 
I. Products Liability <©=»12 
Just as the driver of an automobile is 
:pected to take precautions for the safety 
children playing near a highway even 
ough children can be expected to appreci-
e the risk and the driver does not know 
at the individual children are incompetent 
look after themselves, so too a supplier 
n be expected in marketing a product to 
ke precautions for the safety of children 
LW.2d 759 
and others even if the child m: 
ed to appreciate the risk ai -
children may thus appreciate .' ami in-
stalled in using the product, 
27. Negligence ^=4 
Even if a person recognizes that his 
conduct involves a risk of invading another 
person's interest, he may nevertheless en-
gage in such conduct unless the risk created 
by his conduct is unreasonable. 
28. Negligence <e=> 136(14) 
Balancing of magnitude of the risk and 
utility of the actor's conduct in determining 
whether risk created by conduct is unrea-
sonable requires a consideration by the 
court and the jury of the societal interests 
olved; the issue of negligence may be 
ioved from jury consideration if the 
court concludes that overriding considera-
tions of public policy require that a particu-
lar view be adopted and applied in all cases. 
29. Common Law <s»2 
Statutes and other legislative judg-
ments may themselves be a source of com-
mon law. 
30 Products Liability $»88 
Balancing the magnitude of risk and 
utility of conduct consisting of manufacture 
and sale of slingshots to children, there is 
not sufficient basis for concluding as matter 
of law that utility of conduct outweighs 
risk of harm thereby created, and sharp 
difference of opinion regarding balancing 
of utility and risk of harm would require 
submission of questions for jury assessment 
as part of its consideration of reasonable-
ness of risk of harm and of manufacturers', 
retailers' and wholesalers' conduct in sale of 
slingshots, 
31. Common Law <s=»l 
The common law is not immutable, un-
able to respond to change in society and 
technology, ., .:,,.>,.
 l b . a ^ . j u ,.-.. 
Milan & Miller, Zeff & Zeff, Detroit, for 
plaintiffs and appellants; Edward Grebs, 
Detroit, of counsel 
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Robert E. Fox, Detroit, for defendant-ap-
pellee, cross-appellant and cross-appellee 
Chemtoy Corp., formerly Chemical Sundries 
Co., appearing specially. 
Richard B. Kramer, Southfield, for de-
fendant-appellee, cross-appellant and cross-
appellee King Tobacco. 
Garan, Lucow, Miller, Lehman, Seward & 
Copper, by Albert A. Miller, Detroit, for 
cross-appellees Joseph Alfono, a minor, 
Yvonne Alfono and Vincent Alfono. 
LEVIN, Justice. 
Royal Moning, when he was 12 years old, 
lost the sight of an eye which was struck by 
a pellet fired from a slingshot being used by 
his 11 year old playmate, Joseph Alfono. 
There was evidence that Alfono pur-
chased two lOc-slingshots from defendant 
Campbell Discount Jewelry and had given 
one to Moning, and that the slingshots had 
been manufactured by defendant Chemtoy 
Corporation and distributed by defendant 
King Tobacco and Grocery Company. 
Moning claims that it is negligence to 
market slingshots directly to children, and 
that the manufacturer, wholesaler and re-
tailer are subject to liability. 
The claim against the Alfonos was set-
tled. Upon completion of Moning's proofs, 
the trial judge directed a verdict for the 
remaining defendants. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 
[1,2] We remand for a new trial be-
cause a manufacturer, wholesaler and re-
tailer of a manufactured product owe a 
legal obligation of due care to a bystander 
affected by use of the product, and whether 
defendants in violation of that obligation 
created an unreasonable risk of harm in 
marketing slingshots directly to children is 
for a jury to decide, reasonable persons 
being of different minds. 
My colleague declares that there is no 
legal duty to refrain from manufacturing 
slingshots for and marketing them directly 
to children. 
1. See Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 37, 
REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
[3] It obscures the separate issue 
negligence case (duty, proximate caus 
general and specific standard of ca 
combine and state them together in 
of whether there is a duty to refrain 
particular conduct. 
It is now established that the mai 
turer and wholesaler of a product, by 
keting it, owe a legal duty to those af1 
by its use. The duty of a retailer 
customer with whom he directly deal 
well established long before the mai 
turer and wholesaler were held to 
obligated. The scope of their duty no) 
extends to a bystander. All the defen 
were, therefore, under an "obligatio 
the safety" l of Moning; they owed 1 
duty to avoid conduct that was negl 
Whether it would be a violation oi 
obligation to market slingshots dired 
children is not a question of duty, but < 
specific standard of care: the reasoi 
ness of the risk of harm thereby cr< 
[4] Negligence is conduct involvir 
unreasonable risk of harm. 
Slingshots pose a risk of harm. In r 
facturing and marketing slingshots ti 
fendants necessarily created such a 
The meritorious issues are whet he 
risk so created was unreasonable be 
the slingshots were marketed direct 
children, and whether this should be ( 
ed by the court or by the jury. 
[5] The reasonableness of the rii 
harm, whether analyzed or express* 
terms of duty, proximate cause or the 
cific standard of care, and whether re 
ed as one of law or fact or for the cot 
the jury to decide, turns on how the u 
of the defendants' conduct is view< 
relation to the magnitude of the risk 
If a court is of the opinion that ma 
ing slingshots directly to children is of 
utility that it should be fully protectee 
court in effect determines as a matt 
law that the risk of harm so created i 
unreasonable and, therefore, such cond 
not negligent. 
p. 206, quoted in my colleague's opinion. 
MONING v. 
Cite as 254 N. 
The resolution of the balance between the 
itility of children having ready-market ac-
gss to slingshots and the risk of harm 
hereby created is an aspect of the determi-
nation of the reasonableness of that risk 
nd of the defendants' conduct, and should 
e decided by a jury: 
*'•" —Reasonable persons can differ on the 
balance of utility and risk, and whether 
marketing slingshots directly to children 
creates an unreasonable risk of harm; 
t' .—The interest of children, in ready-
* market access to slingshots is not so 
clearly entitled to absolute protection in 
'comparison with the interest of persons 
who face the risk thereby created as to 
warrant the Court in declaring, as a rule 
of common law, that the risk will be 
deemed to be reasonable, 
-The statement that "we are being asked 
>" perform a legislative task" because a 
riding for Moning "would in effect be 
iaking a value judgment and saying * * 
hat slingshots] should not be manufat 
vred or marketed " (emphasis supplied) to 
lildren assumes that allowing juries to de-
de the reasonableness of the risk of harm 
•eated by marketing slingshots directly to 
lildren will so burden the manufacture 
id marketing of slingshots that all manu-
ituring and marketing would cease, rath-
;;than merely affect the manner and cost 
^marketing slingshots, and does not take 
to account that however the Court decides 
e case it in effect makes a value judg-
ent:; 
^.—Affirming a directed verdict for the 
defendants in effect expresses a value 
judgment that the interest of the child in 
ready-market access to slingshots is of 
such societal importance that as a matter 
of law it takes precedence over the inter-
est in protecting persons exposed to the 
fisk of harm so created, or that all rea-
dable persons would agree that the risk 
Jftrcreated is not unreasonable, • « -, 
Si-|rThe reasonable man represents the general 
£7*1 of community intelligence and perception 
pd the jury, being a cross-section of the com-
?£%, should best be able to tell what that 
lateral level is." 2 Harper & James, The Law 
i Torts, § 16.10, p. 936, 
ALFONO Mich. 763 
W.2d 759 
—Reversing1 the directed verdict and 
holding that the issue should be decided 
by a jury is not an expression of a value 
judgment that slingshots should not be 
manufactured and marketed, but rather 
expresses a value judgment that all rea-
sonable persons do not agree concerning 
the reasonableness of the risk so created 
and that the interest of the child in 
ready-market access is not of such over-
riding importance as to be entitled to 
absolute protection as a matter of law, 
and therefore a jury, applying the com- ' 
munity's judgment of how reasonable 
persons would conduct themselves, should 
make the ultimate value judgment of the 
risks and the societal importance of the 
interests involved in marketing slingshots 
directly to children 
However the Court df d- .1 nec-
essarily makes a choict ' .he Legisla-
ture may later ma?. -rent choice. 
[6] If the issue is left to juries to decide, 
different juries will, indeed, reach different 
results, sometimes in cases appearing to be 
factually indistinguishable. The variant re-
sults may be more perceptible in this kind 
of case than in one where it may appear 
I -e variables. The preference 
for .iution of the issue of negli-
gei is not, however, simply an expedient 
reflecting the difficulty of stating a rule 
that will readily resolve all cases; rather, it 
is rooted in the belief that the jury's judg-
ment of what is, reasonable under the cir-
cumstances of a particular case is more 
likely than the judicial judgment to rep-
resent the community's judgment of how 
reasonable persons would conduct them-
selves 2 
the experience should be that ju-
-iabiy reach one result, that may 
n< specific standard of care upon 
* " reasonable ..persons, would 
Similarly see, Prosser, supra, § 37, p 2^1 De-
troit & M. R, Co, v. Van Steinbhr., " ** - rw 
120 (1868). 
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agree.3 Until the community judgment is 
made so to appear, the principle that doubt-
ful questions regarding the application of 
the standard of care should be decided by 
reference to the community judgment re-
quires jury submission of the question so in 
doubt. 
[8] The law of negligence was created 
by common law judges and, therefore, it is 
unavoidably the Court's responsibility to 
continue to develop or limit the develop-
ment of that body of law absent legislative 
directive. The Legislature has not ap-
proved or disapproved the manufacture of 
slingshots and their marketing directly to 
children; the Court perforce must decide 
what the common law rule shall be. 
I 
Duty and Proximate Cause 
While we all agree that the duty question 
is solely for the court to decide,4 the specific 
standard of care is not part of that ques-
tion. 
[9] The elements of an action for negli-
gence are (i) duty, (ii) general standard of 
care, (iii) specific standard of care, (iv) 
cause in fact, (v) legal or proximate cause, 
and (vi) damage. 
[10] "Duty" comprehends whether the 
defendant is under any obligation to the 
plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct; it does 
not include—where there is an obligation— 
the nature of the obligation: the general 
standard of care and the specific standard 
of care. 
Dean Prosser observed: 
"It is quite possible, and not at all uncom-
mon, to deal with most of the questions 
which arise in a negligence case in terms 
of 'duty/ Thus the standard of conduct 
required of the individual may be ex-
pressed by saying that the driver of an 
automobile approaching an intersection is 
3. See Prosser, supra, § 35, p. 188; 2 Harper & 
James, supra, § 17.2, p. 971. 
4. See Prosser, supra, § 37, p. 206 See, also, 
Elbert v. Saginaw, 363 Mich. 463, 476, 109 
N.W.2d 879 (1961). 
under a duty to moderate his spe< 
keep a proper lookout, or to blo^  
horn, but that he is not under a di 
take precautions against the unexp 
explosion of a manhole cover ir 
street. But the problems of 'duty 
sufficiently complex without subdh 
it in this manner to cover an ei 
series of details of conduct. It is I 
to reserve 'duty1 for the problem c 
relation between individuals which L 
es upon one a legal obligation fo 
benefit of the other, and to deal 
particular conduct in terms of a 
standard of what is required to me< 
obligation. In other words, 'duty' 
question of whether the defendant 
der any obligation for the benefit c 
particular plaintiff; and in negli 
cases, the duty is always the san 
conform to the legal standard of rea 
* ble conduct in the light of the app 
risk. What the defendant must t 
must not do, is a question of the sta 
of conduct required to satisfy the < 
Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 53, p. 324 
phasis supplied). 
The statement in my colleague's 0] 
that the "defendants did not owe pla 
minor the asserted duty not to mai 
ture, distribute and sell slingshots" 
bines the separate questions of duty, $ 
al and specific standard of care and 
mate cause: whether in marketing a 
uct a manufacturer, wholesaler and re 
are under any legal obligation to a bys 
er (duty); the nature of that oblij 
(general standard of care: reasonable 
duct "in the light of the apparent i 
whether marketing slingshots direcl 
children is reasonable conduct (sj 
standard of care); whether marl 
slingshots directly to children is "so s 
cant and important a cause [of loss i 
ing from such marketing] that the d< 
ant should be legally responsible"5 ( 
mate cause, a policy question often in< 
guishable from the duty question). 
5. Prosser, supra, § 42, p. 244. 
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[11] Combining in one statement these 
different questions obscures the functions 
of the court and jury. While the court-
decides questions of duty, general standard 
of care and proximate cause, the jury de-
cides whether there is cause in fact and the 
specific standard of care:6 whether defend-
ants' conduct in the particular case is below 
the general standard of care, including— 
unless the court is of the opinion that all 
reasonable persons would agree or there is 
an overriding legislatively or judicially de-
clared public policy—whether in the partic-
ular case the risk of harm created by the 
defendants' conduct is or is not reasonable. 
[12] Duty is essentially a question of 
whether the relationship7 between the ac-
tor and the injured person gives rise to any 
legal obligation on the actor's part for the 
benefit of the injured person. Proximate 
cause encompasses a number of distinct 
problems including the limits of liability for 
foreseeable consequences.8 In the 
Palsgraf9 case, the New York Court of 
Appeals, combining the questions of duty 
and proximate cause,10 concluded that no 
;s owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff. 
questions of duty and proximate 
are interrelated because the question 
* w h e r there is the requisite relationship, 
giving rise to a duty, and the question 
whether the cause is so significant and im-
portant to be regarded a proximate cause 
ooi h depend in part on foreseeability— 
whether it is foreseeable that the actor's 
* n, § 45, pp. 289-290; § 37, pp. 205-208. 
7. Id., § 42, p. 244; Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich, 
251, 260, 150 N„W„2d 755 (1967). 
8. See generally, H. L. A. Hart and A. M. I Ion-
ore, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1973), ch. IX. 
9. Palsgraf v. Long I. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 3J 
N.E 99 (1928). 
10. Prosser, supra, § 43, p. 254, 
U. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N„Y„ 
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
12. "Agreeing as all of our recent decisions do 
with the developing weight of authority, the 
. essence of which is that the manufacturer is 
N.W.2d 759 
conduct may create a risk of harm to the 
victim, and whether the result of that con-
duct and intervening causes were foreseea-
ble. 
[13] It is well established that placing a 
product on the market creates the requisite 
relationship between a manufacturer, 
wholesaler and retailer and persons affect-
ed by use of the product giving rise to a 
legal obligation or duty to the persons so 
affected. A manufacturer owes the con-
sumer an obligation to avoid negligent con-
duct,11 The obligation extends to persons 
within the foreseeable scope of the risk. In 
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.} 375 
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), a bystand-
er, injured when his brother's shotgun bar-
rel exploded, was permitted to maintain an 
action against the manufacturer, wholesaler 
and retailer of allegedly defective shotgun 
shells.12 • 
A manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer 
of slingshots can be expected to foresee 
that they will be used to propel pellets and 
that a person within range may be struck. 
Moning, as a playmate of a child who pur-
chased a slingshot marketed by the defend-
ants, was within the foreseeable scope of 
the risk created by their conduct in market-
ing slingshots directly to children. Moning 
was a foreseeable plaintiff. The defendant 
manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer were 
under an obligation for the safety of Mon-
ing. 
best, able to control dangers arising from de-
fects of manufacture, I would say definitely 
that Spence v... Three Rivers Builders & Mason-
ry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873; 
Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 
Mich. 235, 409" N.W.2d 918; Barefield v. La-
Salle Cock:£ola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 
N.W.2d 786, and Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply 
Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54, have put 
an end in Michigan to the defense of no privity, 
certainly so far as concerns an innocent by-
stander injured as this plaintiff pleads, and that 
a person thus injured should have a right of 
action against the manufacturer on the theory 
of breach of warranty as well as upon the 
theory of negligence" Hereefield v. Reming-
ton Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 97-98, 133 N.W.2d 
129, 135 (1965) (emphasis supplied). 
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The question of proximate cause, like the 
question of duty, is "essentially a problem 
of law."13 Most proximate cause problems 
are not involved in this case.14 
Alfono's conduct in using the slingshot to 
propel pellets was to be anticipated. "If 
the intervening cause is one which in ordi-
nary human experience is reasonably to be 
anticipated, or one which the defendant has 
reason to anticipate under the particular 
circumstances, he may be negligent, among 
other reasons, because he has failed to 
guard against it; or he may be negligent 
only for that reason." Prosser, supra, § 44, 
p. 272. 
[14] By marketing slingshots directly to 
children, the defendants effectively created 
the risk that Alfono would use the sling-
shot. "Obviously the defendant cannot be 
13. Prosser, supra, § 42, p 244 
"[I]t is possible to approach •proximate 
cause' as a series of distinct problems, more 
or less unrelated, to be determined upon dif-
ferent considerations. The list, which is not 
necessarily exclusive, would include at least 
the following problems. 
"1 . The problem of causation in fact 
* * * 
"2. The problem of apportionment of 
damages among causes. * * * 
"3. The problem of liability for unforesee-
able consequences * * * 
"4. The problem of intervening causes 
* * * 
"5. The problem of shifting responsibility 
* * * " Id., pp 249-250. 
14. See fn 13, supra; there is no issue of ap-
portionment of damages, or of shifting respon-
sibility to another person except insofar as de-
fendants similarly situated might be free to 
leave the duty of protecting a person affected 
by a child's use of a slingshot to adults were 
they to market slingshots in a manner designed 
to reach adults and not children, the issue of 
causation in fact is for a jury to resolve 
relieved from liability by the fact that 
risk, or a substantial and important pari 
the risk, to which he has subjected 
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Fores 
able intervening forces are within the sc 
of the original risk, and hence of the 
fendant's negligence. The courts are qi 
generally agreed that intervening cat 
which fall fairly in this category will 
supersede the defendant's responsibilil 
Id., p. 273.15 
Alfono's shooting pellets toward a t 
and a ricochet into Moning's eye was wit 
the "recognizable risk of harm" created 
marketing slingshots directly to childre 
The ricochet was "a normal conseque 
of the situation" created by the defenda 
conduct.17 
16/ Restatement, supra, § 281, Comment i 
Clause (b) 
"So far as scope of duty (or, as s 
courts put it, the relation of proximate ca 
is concerned, it should make no difien 
whether the intervening actor is negligen 
intentional or criminal Even criminal 
duct by others is often reasonably to be 
ticipated After all, if I leave a borrowed 
on the streets of New York or Chicago ' 
doors unlocked and key m ignition I 
negligent (at least towards the owner) 
cause of the very likelihood of theft Anc 
lend a car to one known by me to be hal 
ally careless I am negligent precisely bec< 
of the likelihood of his negligent operatio 
the car Again the importance of the fa 
of foreseeabihty is not altered if the inter 
ing act is that of plaintiff himself, nor is 
that act is a negligent one When I lent 
car to the careless driver, one of the i 
that made me negligent was surely 
chance that he might hurt himself If \ 
barred from recovery for such hurt it is 
cause of his contributory fault, not for ^ 
of a causal connection or because he is 
yond the scope of my duty " 2 Harpt 
James, supra, § 20 5, pp 1144-1146 
Similarly see Comstock v General Mc 
Corp, 358 Mich 163, 179, 99 N W2d 62"] 
ALR2d 449 (1959), Berry v Visser, 354 N 
38, 47, 92 NW2d 1 (1958) 
17. "The intervention of a force which 
normal consequence of a situation create 
the actor's negligent conduct is not a supei 
mg cause of harm which such conduct 
been a substantial factor in bringing ab< 
Restatement, supra, § 443 
"The word 'normal' is not used m 
Section in the sense of what is usual, cus 
15. The Restatement illustrates the scope of the 
responsibility for delivering a potentially dan-
gerous chattel to a child 
"A gives a loaded pistol to B, a boy of 
eight, to carry to C In handing the pistol to 
C the boy drops it, injuring the bare foot of 
D, his comrade The fall discharges the pis-
tol, wounding C A is subject to liability to 
C, but not to D " Restatement 2d, Torts, 
§ 281, Illustration to Comment f on Clause 
(b). 
'if a gun is entrusted to a child, it suggests 
at once to anyone with imagination at all that 
someone, the child or another, is likely to be 
shot." Prosser, supra, § 44, p 273 
I! 
General Standard of Care Specific 
Standard of Care 
Turning to a consideration of the nature 
of the obligation owed by a manufacturer, 
wholesaler or retailer, we note that this is 
not an ordinary products liability case 
where the plaintiff seeks to recover by 
proving a defect in the product without 
carrying the burden of proving fault or 
negligence. Moning's claim is grounded in 
negligence. He asserts that his damage 
was caused by the fault of the defendants. 
[15] In a negligence case, the standard 
of conduct is reasonable or due care. The 
Restatement 2d, Torts, § 283, provides: 
"The standard of conduct to which [the 
actor] must conform to avoid being negli-
gent is that of a reasonable man under like 
circumstances." "[I]n negligence cases, the 
duty is always the same, to conform to the 
legal standard of reasonable conduct in the 
light of the apparent risk," Prosser, Torts, 
supra, § 53, p. 324, 
It is the application of that general stan-
dard of conduct to the marketing of sling-
shots to children, the specific standard of 
care—not whether there is a duty of due 
care in such marketing—that is the primary 
area of disagreement in this case, 
Manufacturing and marketing slingshots 
necessarily creates a risk of harm. Moning 
does not, however, contend that manufac-
turing and marketing slingshots is negli-
gence per se. His contention, rather, is that 
marketing them directly to children creates 
an unreasonable risk of harm, 
ary, foreseeable, or to be ex. 
notes rather the antithesis o+ 
extraordinary. It means tha 
jury, looking at the matter a 
and therefore knowing the situau-,r. -^!.<. r. 
existed when the new force intervened, does 
not regard its intervention as so extraordina-
ry as to fall outside of the class of normal 
events." Id., comment b. 
18, The doctrine is not limited to plaintiffs 
whose "individual" propensities are known to 
the supplier. The comments following Restate-
ment, supra, § 390, show that the doctrine of 
negligent entrustment also applies to classes of 
persons. Restatement, supra, § 390, Comment. 
JMUJJ1IW V. ALFUJNU MlCtl ^^rJ 
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[16,17] Moning relies on the doctrine of 
negligent entrustment, one of the many 
specific rules concerning particular conduct 
that have evolved in the application of the 
general standard of care. A person who 
supplies an article to a child which may 
pose a reasonable risk of harm in the hands 
of an adult but which poses an unreason-
able risk of harm in the hands of a child is 
subject to liability for resulting harm,*, 
"One who supplies directly or through 
a third person a chattel for the use of 
another whom the supplier knows or has 
reason to know to be likely because of his 
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use 
it in a manner involving unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to himself and oth-
ers whom the supplier should expect to 
share in or be endangered by its use, is 
subject to liability for physical harm re-
sulting to them." Restatement 2d, Torts, 
§ 390.w 
[18,19] The common law has long rec-
ognized that a parent or other responsible 
adult who entrusts a potentially dangerous 
instrumentality to a child may be subject to 
liability.19 Liability "arises from [the de-
fendant's] active misconduct; he has actual-
ly created an unreasonable risk to others by 
placing a chattel in the hands of a person 
whose use thereof is likely to create a rec-
ognizable risk to third persons,"20 
[20] The obuga.:.-
objects which art a^ ± 
arises "because of the 
own intermedd':i 
bee, Harpei \ 
he Conduct o! .L._ 
of their 
.•Tie Duty To Control 
i3 Vale L.J. 886, 894 
t 
21. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 
47 N.W.U.L.Rev. 778, 782 (1953). See Terra-
nella v. Union- Building & Construction Co., 3 
N.J. 443, 70 A.2d 753 (1950). 
"A product designed to be used by adults 
who may be expected to exercise care may 
not be dangerous, but when intended to be 
placed in the hands of inexperienced children 
who may seek to enlarge their knowledge by 
experimentation of various and sometimes 
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with children must "take notice of the ordi-
nary nature of young boys, their tendency 
to do mischievous acts, and their propensity 
to meddle with anything that came in their 
way."22 
[21,22] Special rules for children are 
not unusual. The attractive nuisance doc-
trine, an exception to the general rule limit-
ing the liability of landowners for injuries 
to trespassers,23 is based on the child's ina-
bility to appreciate danger and his inclina-
unsuspected character, it may be a source of 
peril * * *." Crist v Art Metal Works, 
230 App.Div 114, 117, 243 NYS 496, 499 
(1930), affd 255 N.Y. 624, 175 NE 341 
(1931). 
22. Note, Dangerous Toys, 64 Irish L.Times 223, 
224 (1930); 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 40, pp. 
685-686. 
23. See generally, Prosser, supra, § 59, p. 364. 
24. While the Restatements illustrations and 
the case law applying the doctrine of negligent 
entrustment largely concern suppliers of auto-
mobiles (see, e. g., Johnson v Cassetta, 197 
Cal.App.2d 272, 17 Cal.Rptr. 81 [1961]), it does 
not depend on the nature of the chattel. Fred-
ericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich.App. 
580, 585, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973) (supply of dies 
to plaintiffs employer). See also Dee v. Parr-
ish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S W.2d 449, 452 (1959); 
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 69, pp. 949-950; cf 
Woods, Negligent Entrustment: Evaluation of 
a Frequently Overlooked Source of Additional 
Liability, 20 Ark.L.Rev. 101, 107-108 (1966), 
Littlejohn, Torts, 21 Wayne L.Rev. 665, 681 
(1975). Nor is the doctrine restricted to chat-
tels classified as latently defective or inherently 
dangerous. Fredencks, supra, 48 Mich.App p. 
584, 211 N.W.2d 44. 
The Restatement sets forth a rule crystahzed 
by the development of the common law con-
cerning the liability of one who sells or entrusts 
devices to children who, because of their youth 
and inexperience, cannot be relied on to use 
them prudently, or because of their immaturity 
may not appreciate the nsk of injury or have 
the skill to use such devices safely: 
"At common law the legal principle is es-
tablished that if one sells a dangerous article 
or instrumentality such as firearms or explo-
sives to a child whom he knows or ought to 
know to be, by reason of youth and inexperi-
ence, unfit to be trusted with it, and who 
might innocently and ignorantly play with or 
use it to his injury, and injury does in fact 
result, he may be found guilty of negligence 
and consequently liable in damages." Anno., 
Liability of Seller of Firearm, Explosive, or 
Highly Inflammable Substance to Child, 20 
A.L.R.2d 119, 124. 
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tion to explore without regard to the 
The doctrine does not depend on the 1 
owner's knowledge that the "individ 
child is "incompetent." 
[23,24] The doctrine of negligent 
trustment is not peculiar to automobiles 
rather an ordinary application of gei 
principles for determining whether a 
son's conduct was reasonable in light o 
apparent risk.24 It is grounded in the 
eral principle that a reasonable person 
See also 79 Am Jur 2d, Weapons and Fire 
§ 43, p 48 
"The common law imposes upon ever 
the duty of so using and disposing < 
property as not to injure the person or 
erty of another, and if one sells a dang 
article to a child whom he knows to 1 
reason of his youth and inexperience, u 
be trusted with it, and who probably 
innocently and ignorantly play with it 
own injury, and injury does in fact res 
is liable in damages therefor." McEl 
Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 392, 116 N W 14 
(1908). 
In McEldon, the court held that the seller 
cents worth of gun powder to a 12 year c 
was liable for the injury to one *of the 
eyes caused by an inadvertent explosioi 
also Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 A 
682 (1868). 
Entrusting other devices used by chile 
playthings may also give rise to liabihr 
Schmidt v. Capital Candy Co, 139 Mm 
166 N.W. 502 (1918) (sparkler) (dictum 
serman v. Smith, 205 MoApp 657, 22 
608 (1920) (fireworks); Gerbino v Gr 
Siegel-Cooper Co., 165 App.Div. 76 
N.Y.S. 502 (1915) (airgun used on n 
premises); Sememuk v Chentis, 1 111 
508, 117 NE2d 883 (1954) (airgun; 
parents, retailer knew that 7 year old 
use), Krueger v Knutson, 261 Minn 1 
NW2d 526 (1961) (potassium chlora 
Faso v La Faso, 126 Vt 90, 223 A 
(1966) (cigarette lighter without fluid) 
supra, 64 Irish L Times 223 (citing ca 
The only basis for distinguishing the 
from the instant case would be to concl 
there is a qualitative difference betw 
nsk of entrusting such mstrumentahtiei 
dren and the nsk posed by marke t^ir 
shots directly to children. In light of 
quency and seventy of mjunes to chi] 
tnbutable to slingshots, and the wid 
view, expressed in statutes and ore 
that children should not be entrust 
slingshots, there is no sound basis for 
as a matter of law, such a distinctioi 
MONING v. 
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have in mind the immaturity, inexperience 
and carelessness of children. If, taking 
those traits into account, a reasonable per-
son would recognize that his conduct in-
volves a risk of creating an invasion of the 
child's or some other person's interest, he is 
required to recognize that his conduct does 
involve such a risk. "He should realize that 
the inexperience and immaturity of young 
children may lead them to act innocently in 
a way which an adult would recognize as 
culpably careless, and that older children 
are peculiarly prone to conduct which they 
themselves recognize as careless or even 
reckless." Restatement, supra, § 290, com-
ment k.25 
[25] The issue whether the defendants 
are subject to liability cannot properly be 
taken from the jury on the supposition that 
an 11 year old boy knows how a slingshot 
operates and, therefore, appreciates the 
risk.26 Even if it is thought, without sup-
porting evidence and as a matter of law, 
that children should be deemed to appreci-
ate the risk, there still may be an unreason-
able risk of physical harm to the child and 
others in marketing slingshots directly to 
them. 
Entrusting potentially dangerous articles 
to a child may pose an unreasonable risk of 
harm not only because the child may not 
appreciate the risk or may not have the skill 
25. An actor "is required to recognize that his 
conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion 
of another's interest if a reasonable man would 
do so while exercising (a) such attention, per-
ception of the circumstances, memory, knowl-
edge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, 
and judgment as a reasonable man would have; 
. * * *" Restatement, supra, § 289. 
"For the purpose of determining whether the 
actor should recognize that his conduct in-
?
*
r
 volves a risk, he is required to know 
r /
 "(a) the qualities and habits of human be-
;* ings and animals and the qualities, character-
istics, and capacities of things and forces in 
so far as they are matters of common knowl-
*r edge at the time and in the community." Id., 
n § 290. 
& There is some evidence that one of the rea-
* sons slingshot injuries are experienced by chil-
* dren between the ages of 5 and 14 in dispropor-
' tion to the populace generally is that the risk is 
'"not appreciated. See, Johnston, Perforating 
Eye Injuries: A Five Year Survey, 91 TransaC-
254 N.WJd—17 
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to use the article safely but—even if he 
does appreciate the risk and does have the 
requisite skill—because he may recklessly 
ignore the risk and use the article frivolous-
ly due to immaturity of judgment, exuber-
ance of spirit, or sheer bravado. 
"One has no right to demand of a child, 
or of any other person known to be want-
ing in ordinary judgment or discretion, a 
prudence beyond his years or capacity, 
and therefore in his own conduct, where 
it may possibly result in injury, a degree 
of care is required commensurate to the 
apparent immaturity or imbecility that 
exposes the other to peril. Thus, a per-
son driving rapidly along a highway 
where he sees boys engaged in sports, is 
not at liberty to assume that they will 
exercise the same discretion in keeping 
out of his way that would be exercised by 
others; and ordinary care demands of 
him that he shall take notice of their 
immaturity and govern his action accord-
ingly." 3 Cooley, Law of Torts (4th ed.), 
§ 490, pp. 433-434. 
[26] Just as the driver of an automobile 
is expected to take precautions for the safe-
ty of children playing near a highway even 
though children can be expected to appreci-
ate the risk and the driver does not know 
that the individual children are incompetent 
to look after themselves,27 so too a supplier 
tions of the Ophthalmological Soc'y U.K. 895, 
897 (1971); Kerby, Eye Accidents to School 
Children, 20 Sight-Saving Rev. 2 (1950). 
27. Reasonable precautions must be taken even 
though the actor does not know that an individ-
ual child is not competent and the child may 
appreciate the risk: 
"And when children are in the vicinity, 
much is necessarily to be expected of them 
which would not be looked for on the part of 
an adult. It may be anticipated that a child 
will dash into the street in the path of a car, 
or meddle with a turntable. It may be clear 
negligence to entrust him with a gun, or to 
allow him to drive an automobile, or to throw 
candy where a crowd of boys will scramble 
for it. There have been a number of 'pied 
piper' cases, in which street vendors of ice 
cream, and the like, which attract children 
into the street, have been held liable for fail-
ure to protect them against traffic. It may 
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can be expected in marketing a product to 
take precautions for the safety of children 
and others even if the child may be expect-
ed to appreciate the risk and individual 
children may both appreciate it and be 
skilled in using the product. It is for a jury 
to decide whether any negligence in mar-
keting slingshots directly to children is a 
cause in fact of plaintiffs loss.28 
Ill 
Reasonableness of the Risk of Harm 
[27] Even if a person recognizes that his 
conduct involves a risk of invading another 
person's interest, he may nevertheless en-
gage in such conduct unless the risk created 
by his conduct is unreasonable. 
The reasonableness of the risk depends on 
whether its magnitude is outweighed by its 
be quite as negligent to leave the gun, or to 
leave dynamite caps, where children are like-
ly to come, and can easily find them In all 
such cases, the question comes down essen-
tially to one of whether the risk outweighs 
the utility of the actor's conduct. He may be 
required to guard a power line pole located in 
a public park, but not one m the open coun-
try; and whether he must take steps to pre-
vent children from interfering with such an 
object as a stationary vehicle is entirely a 
matter of the circumstances of the particular 
case." Prosser, supra, § 33, pp. 172-173. 
"In addition, people who have an ordinary 
amount of exposure to the facts of modern 
life in America will be treated as though they 
know many other things. The normal adult 
is held to have knowledge of the characteris-
tics of animals common to his community, 
such as the proneness of mules to kick, the 
viciousness of bulls, and the propensity of 
mad dogs to bite. He is also required to be 
acquainted with the natural propensities of 
children?5 the dangers incident to corn-
utility. The Restatement provide 
"Where an act is one which a reasonal 
man would recognize as involving a risk 
harm to another, the risk is unreasona 
and the act is negligent if the risk is of si 
magnitude as to outweigh what the 1 
regards as the utility of the act or of 
particular manner in which it is done/1 ] 
statement, supra, § 291. 
[28] The balancing of the magnitude 
the risk and the utility of the actor's c 
duct requires a consideration by the cc 
and jury of the societal interests involve 
The issue of negligence may be remo 
from jury consideration if the court < 
eludes that overriding considerations 
public policy require that a particular \ 
be adopted and applied in all cases. 
'? 2d 944 (1945). Compare § 27 5 infra. 
Harper & James, supra, § 16.5, pp 912-
mon sports, and the elements of the wea 
to which he is accustomed. 
The trier of fact decides whether reasoi 
precautions have been taken and thereb 
tabhshes the specific standard of care 
"The common formula for the 'neglij 
standard is the conduct of a reasonable 
under like circumstances. In applying 
standard under the instructions of the < 
the jury normally is expected to dete 
what the general standard of conduct i 
require in the particular case, and so to 
particular standard of its own within th 
eral one. This function is commonly s 
be one of the determination of a quest 
fact, and not of law. It differs rroi 
function of the court, however, only in 
is not reduced to any definite rules, s 
the same conclusion will not necessai 
reached in two identical cases, and that 
secondary function, performed only afi 
court has reached its initial conclusio 
the issue is for the jur> " Restateme 
pra, § 328 C, Comment on Clause (b 
28. A jury might conclude that because th 
was skilled in the use of a slingshot and 
use it frivolously, the manner of market 
slingshot was not the cause m fact of pU 
injury. 
29. "Conduct is not negligent unless the 
tude of the nsk involved therein so out 
its utility as to make the nsk unreas 
Therefore, one relying upon neghgenc 
cause of action or defense must convu 
court and jury that this is the case." F 
ment, supra, § 291, Comment b, p. 55 ( 
sis supplied). 
"35 Such as their heedlessness—Femhng 
v. Star Publication Co., 195 Wash 395, 81 
P.2d 293 (1938); the attractiveness of ponds 
of water—Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 
513, 273 S.W. 401, 40 AX R. 473 (1925), the 
attractiveness of dangerous objects such as 
explosives—Wellman v. Fordson Coal Co., 
105 W.Va. 463, 143 S.E. 160 (1928), childish 
impulses—Louisville & N. R. Co v. Vaughn, 
292 Ky. 120, 166 S.W.2d 43 (1943), climbing 
propensity—Beaton's Administrator v. Ken-
tucky & West Virginia Power Co., 291 Ky. 
304, 164 S.W.2d 468 (1942); propensity of 
small children to wander into streets—Ag-
deppa v. Glougie, 71 Cal.App2d 463, 162 
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A court would thus refuse to allow a jury 
to consider whether an automobile manu-
facturer should be liable for all injuries 
resulting from manufacturing automobiles 
on the theory that it is foreseeable that 
some 50,000 persons may be killed and hun-
dreds of thousands injured every year as a 
result of manufacturing automobiles. The 
utility of providing automobile transporta-
tion is deemed by society to override the 
magnitude of the risk created by their man-
ufacture. Similarly, a court might conclude 
that it would be violative of public policy to 
hold a manufacturer of slingshots liable for 
all injuries resulting from their use. The 
interest of mature persons who wish to 
purchase and use slingshots might be 
deemed to supersede the interest of those 
who may be harmed by their careless or 
improper use. 
The issue in the instant case is not wheth-
er slingshots should be manufactured, but 
the narrower question of whether market-
ing slingshots directly to children creates an 
mreasonable risk of harm. In determining 
;hat question, the Court must first ask 
whether the utility of marketing slingshots 
lirectly to children so overrides the risk 
hereby created as to justify the Court in 
efusing to permit juries to subject persons 
yho engage in such conduct to liability for 
he resulting harm. If it concludes that the 
tility does not, as a matter of law, override 
he risk, then the question of balancing 
tility and risk is for the jury to decide, 
gain, as part of its consideration of the 
sasonableness of defendants' conduct, un-
ss the Court concludes that all reasonable 
). Projections from one study indicate that 
nearly 66,000 school children in the United 
States during any 9-month school year suffer 
injuries to the eye. Over 4% of the reported 
injuries in a study carried out in Louisville 
were caused by slingshots and other weapons. 
Such instrumentalities were responsible for 
17% of the more serious injuries. Kerby, su-
?ra, 20 Sight Saving Rev., pp. 3-4, 11. 
Another study shows that "[tjhere were an 
estimated 471 injuries related to slingshots and 
ling propelled toys during the period July 1, 
974-July 30, 1975, treated in United States 
tospital emergency rooms, all but 2 of which 
/ere head or eye injuries to victims under 15 
ears of age." U. S. Consumer Product Safety 
ommission, Bureau of Epidemiology, Special 
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persons would be of one mind on that ques-
tion. 
The Restatement suggests a number of 
factors that should be considered in balanc-
ing the utility of the actor's conduct and 
the magnitude of the risk. First, the mag-
nitude of the risk: 
"In determining the magnitude of the 
risk for the purpose of determining 
whether the actor is negligent, the fol-
lowing factors are important: 
"(a) the social value which the law at-
taches to the interests which are imper-
iled; 
"(b) the extent of the chance that the 
actor's conduct will cause an invasion of 
any interest of the other or of one of a 
class of which the other is a member; 
"(c) the extent of the harm likely to be 
caused to the interests imperiled; 
"(d) the number of persons whose in-
terests are likely to be invaded if the risk 
takes effect in harm." Restatement, su-
pra, § 293. 
a) The law attaches a high social value to 
the interest of persons in unimpaired eye-
sight. 
b) Slingshots are potentially dangerous. 
An expert witness, called by Moning, testi-
fied that the slingshots Alfono purchased 
were capable of launching projectiles at 
speeds exceeding 350 miles per hour. Sling-
shots cause hundreds of serious injuries 
each year to school age children. Almost 
all these injuries are head or eye injuries 
and occur to children 5 to 14.30 Experience 
Report: Injuries Associated with Products 
Which Have Projectiles (Draft, October 23, 
1975), p. 15. During the same time period, 
2,120 injuries reported to hospital emergency 
rooms involved projectile products. Id., p. 17. 
The U. S. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion states that since "[s]lingshots range from 
toys to hunting models capable of killing small 
game * * * it is recommended that high 
powered slingshots be sold only to persons 
over 20 years of age." Id., p. 23. The Commis-
sion concluded that "[o]verall, projectile prod-
ucts include a diverse array of products which 
while they share a common hazard are very 
different in age of users, intended use, and 
likelihood and consequences of misuse," and 
that therefore "Commission action would be 
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therefore shows that marketing slingshots 
to children may with substantial frequency 
cause an invasion of the interest in unim-
paired eyesight of a substantial number of 
persons. 
c) The extent of the harm likely to be 
caused to the interest so imperiled may be 
of a most serious nature. 
d) The number of persons whose inter-
ests are likely to be invaded is difficult to 
estimate, but it appears that hundreds of 
injuries, many resulting in serious impair-
ment of vision, occur every year as a result 
of the use of slingshots by children.31 
Turning to utility: 
"In determining what the law regards 
as the utility of the actor's conduct for 
the purpose of determining whether the 
actor is negligent, the following factors 
are important: 
"(a) the social value which the law at-
taches to the interest which is to be ad-
vanced or protected by the conduct; 
"(b) the extent of the chance that this 
interest will be advanced or protected by 
the particular course of conduct; 
"(c) the extent of the chance that such 
interest can be adequately advanced or 
protected by another and less dangerous 
course of conduct." Restatement 2d, 
Torts, § 292. 
most effective" "in the area of toy guns and 
other toy weapons with projectiles and sling-
shots." Id. 
31. See fn. 30, supra, and accompanying text. 
32. The United States Supreme Court, relying 
on state statutes providing for wrongful death 
actions and overruling cases to the contrary, 
held that under general maritime law there was 
a cause of action for wrongful death. 
State courts created an action for wrongful 
death in admiralty cases, based on statutes not, 
by their terms, applicable to maritime cases. 
In that context, judges were "awake to the 
purport of this legislative movement, eagerly 
seized upon principles derivable from 'natural 
equity' and 'consonant * * * with the be-
nign spirit of English and American legislation 
on the subject' to mould admiralty law to con-
form with the trend of civilized thought." Lan-
dis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harv.Le-
gal Essays 213, 226 (1934). Several state 
courts have relied on statutes in other jurisdic-
a) There is a sharp difference of opinion 
concerning the social value of the child's 
interest in having direct-market access to 
slingshots. The view that slingshots should 
not be sold or used by children is widely 
held and is reflected in statutes and ordi-
nances prohibiting the sale of slingshots tc 
or their use by minors. 
[29] Statutes and other legislative judg-
ments may themselves be a source of com-
mon law. "This legislative establishment oJ 
policy carries significance beyond the par-
ticular scope of each of the statutes in 
volved. The policy thus established has be 
come itself a part of our law, to be given iti 
appropriate weight not only in matters o 
statutory construction but also in those o 
decisional law." Moragne v. States Marin 
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-391, 90 S.Ct. 1772 
1782,.26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970).32 Similarly, se 
Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 14, 26--2S 
215 N.W.2d 149 (1974).33 
North Carolina and Mississippi prohibi 
sale of a slingshot to a minor.34 Id ah 
prohibits sale to a minor under 16 withoi 
parental consent.35 Mississippi holds a h 
ther liable for allowing a son under 16 1 
have, own or carry concealed a slingshot. 
Pennsylvania prohibits sale to and carryiii 
by persons under 18 of an implemei 
"which impels a pellet of any kind with 
force that can reasonably be expected 1 
tions as "the wiser and safer rule," notwit 
standing local common law to the contrary, 
holding that a general devise operates to ex 
cute a power of appointment vested in tl 
testator. Id., p. 231. 
Legislative judgments or trends and statuto 
changes may be relevant in assessing the "r 
tional conscience" in common law and cons 
tutional adjudication. See Furman v. Georg 
408 U.S. 238, 298-299, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Brennan, J., concumn 
33. In extending the obligation of an abstract 
to persons not in privity of contract, this Coi 
relied in part on statutes of other jurisdictic 
so providing. 
34. N.CGen.Stat. § 14-315; Miss.Code A 
§ 97-37-13. 
35. Idaho Code § 18-3302. 
36. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-37-15. 
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cause bodily harm".37 Nine states prohibit 
any person from carrying a concealed sling-
shot38 A number of states consider sling-
shots to be deadly weapons and treat them 
under statutes prohibiting carrying con-
cealed weapons.39 Many cities regulate the 
sale and possession of slingshots.40 
Michigan empowers fourth class cities to 
'prohibit and punish the use of toy pistols, 
iling shots and other dangerous toys or 
mplements within the city" (emphasis sup-
>lied).41 Nine cities in this state prohibit 
>ersons from possessing slingshots,42 five 
>thers prohibit possession by or sale to mi-
iors.43 Those ordinances generally classify 
lingshots as "dangerous weapons."44 
It is apparent from the legislation in oth-
r states and innumerable municipalities 
hat all reasonable persons do not agree 
lat marketing slingshots directly to chil-
ren does not involve an unreasonable risk 
f harm. The failure of other states and 
ties to enact like statutes and ordinances, 
id of the Legislature either to authorize or 
•ohibit the marketing of slingshots direct-
'. Pa.Stat.Ann., title 18, § 6304 (Purdon). 
. Alas.Stat.Ann. § 11.55.010; Idaho Code 
§ 18-3302; Miss.Code Ann. § 97-37-1; Mont. 
Rev.Codes Ann. § 94-3525; Tenn.Code Ann. 
5 39-4901; Utah Code Ann. § 76-23-4; N.C. 
3en.Stat. § 14-269; S.C.Code § 16-23-460; 
U.Gen.Laws § 11-47-42. 
Alas.Stat.Ann. § 11.55.010 (treated, along 
vith pistols, firearms and daggers, under carry-
rig concealed weapons statute); Del.Code 
ton., title 11, § 222(5) (defined to be a "deadly 
weapon"); D.C.Code Ann. § 22-3217 ("danger-
ous article"); Idaho Code § 18-3302 (treated 
rith "concealed and dangerous weapons"); 
id.Code Ann. § 35-1-79-1 (Burns) ("danger-
us weapon"); Mass Laws Ann., ch. 269, § 12 
sale prohibited, along with switch knife, sword 
ane, bludgeon and blackjack); Miss.Code 
nn. § 97-37-1 ("deadly weapon"); Mont.Rev. 
odes Ann. § 94-3525 ("deadly weapon"); N.J. 
tat.Ann. §§ 2A:151-2, 2A:151-5 (West) 
weapon," "dangerous instrument"); N.C. 
en.Stat. § 14-269 ("deadly weapon"); S.C. 
3de § 16-23-460 ("deadly weapon"); Tenn. 
xie Ann. § 39-4901 ("dangerous weapon"); 
tan Code Ann. § 76-23-4 ("deadly weapon"). 
« Ga,Code Ann. § 26-2901, committee notes, 
201. 
39 Fed.Reg. 16707-16710 (1974). 
M.C.L.A. § 91.1; M.S.A. § 5.1740. 
ly to children, indicates a variety of opinion, 
but not a consensus regarding the reasona-
bleness of marketing slingshots directly to 
children. 
b) Children are more likely to obtain 
slingshots if they are marketed directly to 
them. 
c) Slingshots could be marketed in a 
manner designed to confine sale to adults 
and to exclude purchases by children. In-
stead of manufacturers, wholesalers and re-
tailers effectively determining whether 
children shall have slingshots, an adult who 
generally would know the child would de-
cide whether he is of sufficient maturity to 
have one; the adult would, under the com-
mon law, assume responsibility for any neg-
ligence on his part in entrusting a slingshot 
to the child. 
Having in mind the parent's interest in 
protecting the child from potentially dan-
gerous instrumentalities45 and in avoiding 
exposure to litigation such as befell the 
Alfonos, the child's interest in an opportuni-
Home-rule cities possess the police power 
and thus there is no need for specific enabling 
legislation. M.C.L.A. § 117.3; M.S.A. § 5.2073. 
42. Belding ordinances, § 12.11; Buchanan ordi-
nances, § 11.4; Center Line ordinances, § 8-
108; Escanaba ordinances, § (D); Grand Haven 
ordinances, § 8-209; Hazel Park ordinances, 
§ 15; Sterling Heights ordinances, § 7.(1); 
Trenton ordinances, § 9.171, and Warren ordi-
nances, § 8-210. See 39 Fed.Reg. 16708-16710 
(1974). 
43. Gladstone ordinances, § 504.06 (prohibits 
possession, sale, or gift to persons younger 
than 18); Lake Orion ordinances, § 9 (prohibits 
sale, offer to sale, give away or distribute to 
persons under the age of 21); Port Huron ordi-
nances, § 9.117 (prohibits parents to knowingly 
permit child under 18 to use or possess except 
under adult supervision); Waterford ordi-
nances, § 61-IX (prohibits possession, sale or 
gift to persons younger than 21); Royal Oak 
ordinances, § 276.1(c) (prohibits selling or giv-
ing to persons under 16). See 39 Fed.Reg. 
16707-16710 (1974). 
44. See 39 Fed.Reg., supra. 
45. See generally 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parent and 
Child, § 106, p. 205 et seq.; Prosser, supra, 
§ 125, p. 888 et seq. 
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ty to use slingshots cannot be said as a 
matter of law to be inadequately advanced 
or protected by allowing a jury to decide 
that a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer 
is negligent in marketing them directly to 
children. 
[30] Balancing the magnitude of the 
risk and the utility of the conduct in the 
application of the factors suggested by the 
Restatement, there is not a sufficient basis 
for concluding as a matter of law that the 
utility of the defendants' conduct outweighs 
the risk of harm thereby created. The 
sharp difference of opinion regarding the 
balancing of utility and risk of harm re-
quires submission of these questions for 
jury assessment as part of its consideration 
of the reasonableness of the risk of harm 
and of defendants' conduct. 
[31] While "slingshots have a long histo-
ry of association with the human race" and 
have been used for hundreds of years by 
both adults and children, the common law is 
not immutable, unable to respond to 
changes in society and technology. 
"The customary usage and practice of the 
industry is relevant evidence to be used 
in determining whether or not this stan-
dard [of reasonably prudent conduct] has 
been met. Such usage cannot, however, 
be determinative of the standard. As 
stated by Justice Holmes: 
" 'What usually is done may be evi-
dence of what ought to be done, but what 
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of 
reasonable prudence, whether it usually is 
complied with or not.' Texas and Pacific 
R. Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 U.S. 468, 
470, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905." Marietta 
v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 385 Mich. 364, 369-
370, 189 N.W.2d 208, 209 (1971). 
46. A slingshot is no more a toy than a sparkler, 
fireworks, an air gun or an empty cigarette 
lighter, yet courts have sustained liability for 
the entrustment of such articles to children. 
See fn. 24, supra. Books prepared for parents 
speak of the dangers of such "toys." See, e. g., 
Swartz, Toys That Don't Care (Gambit, Inc., 
1971), p. 251. The toy industry has acknowl-
edged its awareness of the nsks; the industry's 
proposed draft of Voluntary Product Standards 
for Toy Safety (May, 1972), while excluding 
slingshots from coverage, states that there are 
As society becomes increasingly urban-
ized and access to open space decreases, the 
law responds and develops. 
Modern technology may have magnified 
the risk of ricochet and of injury to persons 
not in the immediate range or direction in 
which the slingshot is aimed. Slingshots 
capable of firing projectiles at 350 miles per 
hour may be a far cry from those historical-
ly made by children from rubber bands and 
household paraphernalia. 
Nor does calling a slingshot a "toy" make 
it any less dangerous nor immunize its mar 
keting directly to children from the genera 
rules of negligence liability.46 
There is a qualitative difference betweei 
slingshots and other projectile "toys" on th 
one hand, and baseball equipment and bicj 
cles-on the other. The latter are viewed b 
society essentially as are automobiles i 
that although children are injured an 
killed riding bicycles and playing basebal 
the utility of such activity is regarded I 
society and all reasonable persons as ou 
weighing the risk of harm created by the 
manufacture for and marketing to childre 
Statutes and ordinances do not prohibit t1 
purchase or use of bicycles or baseb; 
equipment by children. There is no ong 
ing debate, as there is about slingsho 
whether children should have direct marl 
access to bicycles or baseball equipme 
In sum, it cannot be said that there v 
no "obligation of reasonable conduct for 1 
benefit of the plaintiff",47 or that all r 
sonable men would agree that defendar 
conduct was not "a substantial factor 
producing the result"48 or regarding " 
foreseeability of [the] particular risk"49 
regarding "the reasonableness of the 
"[c]ertam well-recognized hazards inheiren 
such traditional toys as bows and arrc 
slingshots and darts," quoted in Swartz, Bi 
ness in the Toy Box, 43 Sight Saving Pev 
97 (1973). 
47. Prosser, supra, § 45, pp. 289-290. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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fendants* conduct with respect to it, or the 
normal character of [Alfono's conduct]"50 
as an intervening cause. 
Since reasonable persons can differ re-
garding the balance of risk and utility (the 
reasonableness of the risk of harm) and 
since there is no overriding policy based on 
social utility of maintaining absolute access 
to slingshots by children, we reverse and 
remand for a new trial 
KAVANAGH, C. J., and WILLIAMS, J., 
concur. 
RYAN and MOODY, JJ., not participat-
ing. 
FITZGERALD, Justice. 
This appeal concerns the propriety of a 
trial court's grant of directed verdict in 
favor of defendants, the manufacturer, 
wholesaler, and retailers of a slingshot, in 
an action brought by plaintiff to recover for 
injuries sustained as a result of use of the 
slingshot. 
Evidence introduced at trial indicated 
that on August 17,1967, Joseph Alfono, age 
11, purchased two ten-cent slingshots from 
defendant Campbell Discount Jewelry. He 
gave one of the slingshots to plaintiff, age 
12, and the boys rode their bicycles to a 
nearby park. At the park plaintiff and 
Joseph Alfono employed their slingshots to 
shoot projectiles at frogs which they found 
in the vicinity of a pond. The incident of 
injury occurred when plaintiff was standing 
near the small pond and Joseph was on the 
side of a nearby hill. Joseph called to plain-
tiff to look up and watch as Joseph shot at 
a bird. When plaintiff looked up, he was 
struck in the left eye by a projectile from 
Joseph's slingshot. Evidence introduced at 
trial indicated that the injuring slingshot 
was manufactured by Chemical Sundries, 
Inc.,1 and distributed by King Tobacco and 
Grocery Co. 
50. id. 
1. After commencement of this litigation the 
name of defendant was changed to Chemtoy 
Corporation. 
2. The Alfonos are party to a cross-appeal con-
cerning their respective rights against the other 
A W U H U ivncn. / / £ 
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Settlement was agreed upon between 
plaintiff and defendant Alfonos with the 
result that the Alfonos were only nominal 
parties to the litigation.2 The trial court, 
upon motion of the remaining defendants 
after presentation of plaintiff's proofs, 
granted directed verdict in favor of defend-
ants, opining that defendants owed plaintiff 
no legal duty upon which recovery could be 
premised and that defendants' conduct was 
not the proximate cause of plaintiffs inju-
ry.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed in an 
unpublished per curiam opinion. We grant-
ed leave to appeal. 
We would affirm the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals, concluding defendants 
did not owe plaintiff minor the asserted 
duty not to manufacture, distribute and sell 
slingshots. 
I 
Prosser, in his treatise on the law of 
torts, offers the following analysis of the 
role of the court and jury respecting the 
question of whether a legal duty is owed by 
one party to another: 
"3. The existence of a duty. In other 
words, whether, upon the facts in evi-
dence, such a relation exists between the 
parties that the community will impose a 
legal obligation upon one for the benefit 
of the other—or, more simply, whether 
the interest of the plaintiff which has 
suffered invasion was entitled to legal 
protection at the hands of the defendant. 
This is entirely a question of law, to be 
determined by reference to the body of 
statutes, rules, principles and precedents 
which make up the law; and it must be 
determined only by the court. It is no 
part of the province of a jury to decide 
whether a manufacturer of goods is un-
der any obligation for the safety of the 
defendants in the event this Court were to set 
aside the directed verdict entered by the tnal 
court. 
3. The tnal court's extensive opinion was issued 
from the bench and evidences thorough consid-
eration of the case before that court. 
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ultimate consumer, * * *. A decision 
by the court that, upon any version of the 
facts, there is no duty, must necessarily 
result in judgment for the defendant." 
(Emphasis supplied.) Prosser, Torts (4th 
Ed.), § 37, p. 206. 
Decisions of this Court have in similar 
fashion recognized that the question of duty 
is to be resolved by the court rather than 
the jury. See Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., 
Inc., 383 Mich. 158,162,174 N.W.2d 752, 754 
(1970), in which the Court viewed summary 
judgment for defendant manufacturer of a 
wire milk bottle carrier proper after deter-
mination that there was "no legal duty to 
supply a carrier so designed as to prevent 
bottles placed therein from breaking when 
dropped to a hard surface". Also, see JSo-
nin v. Gralewicz, 378 Mich. 521, 527, 146 
N.W.2d 647 (1966). 
The trial court in this case found no legal 
duty owed plaintiff by defendants. We 
now review—as a question of law—that 
determination. 
II 
During the course of proceedings below 
plaintiff has alleged that the defendants 
violated numerous duties4 which attached 
liability. Through the sifting and winnow-
ing action of the trial and appellate process 
these allegations have been refined so that 
we have presently before us only the fol-
lowing contention as stated at page 11 of 
plaintiff's brief: 
"Plaintiff's position [is] that the de-
fendants had a duty as reasonably pru-
dent manufacturers, distributors and re-
tail merchants not to manufacture, mar-
ket and sell these slingshots to young 
children." 
It is asserted that two factors give rise to 
this duty: 
4. Among these duties was the duty to warn 
plaintiff purchaser of the dangerous propensi-
ties of a slingshot either by personal notifica-
tion as in the case of a retailer or by printed 
notice as in the case of the wholesaler and 
manufacturer. Other courts have uniformly re-
jected a duty to warn when confronted with 
products, like the slingshot, the dangerous pro-
pensities of which are well known. See, e. g., 
Pitts v. Basile, 35 I11.2d 49, 219 N.E.2d 472 
(1966), and Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal.App.2d 
"(1) the inherently dangerous m 
of the slingshot, and (2) the youthfu 
and lack of discretion of the purchaj 
The question before us is not settle 
Michigan case law precedent. A re 
question was considered by this Court, 
ever, in Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich 
50 N.W. 135 (1891). In Chaddock, a 
gun case, this Court affirmed a dir 
verdict in favor of the father-purchai 
an air gun used by a neighbor boy in i 
ous fashion. Evidence indicated the 
er, rather than the father, was in "co 
of the premises at the time the gui 
loaned to and used by the visiting 
Negligence of the mother was not ass 
The court concluded: 
"It was not negligence per se i 
defendant to buy this toy gun, and 
it in the hands of the boy nine ye 
age; and there were too many int 
ing causes without the act or kno^  
, of the defendant, between the buj 
the gun and the injury to hold t 
fendant liable for its use in this CJ 
his own son had in any manner cor 
ed to the accident, a different q 
would arise, upon which I expr 
opinion." supra, 230, 50 N.W. 13 
Whalen v. Bennett, 4 Mich.App. 
N.W.2d 797 (1966), involved the . 
stance of injury which occurred wl 
fendant's son shot an air gun while 
with friends and injured one of his c 
ions. The Court of Appeals5, co 
that the trial court's grant of si 
judgment was improper, there bei 
dence indicating that a duty on the 
the parent, to supervise the use o: 
strumentality as dangerous as an 
had been breached.6 Neither Chadt 
468, 22 Cal.Rptr. 572 (1962). See, al 
ser, Torts (4th Ed.), § 96, p. 649. 
5. Justice Fitzgerald authored the opin 
sitting as a judge of the Court of 
6. See for an analogous holding, which 
ally discusses application of Res tat 
Torts Second, § 390, discussed infi 
Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 
App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973). 
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Whalen dealt with the liability of retailers, 
wholesalers, or manufacturers.7 
Cases from other jurisdictions offer in-
struction not afforded by Michigan prece-
dent. In Pitts v. Basile, 35 I11.2d 49, 219 
N.E.2d 472 (1966), a child struck by a dart 
thrown by another child brought suit 
against the wholesaler of the dart and the 
retailer from whom the darts had been pur-
chased. The appeal considered only the 
question of the wholesalers liability. The 
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there 
was insufficient causal connection between 
alleged negligence on the part of the whole-
saler and resulting injury, finding that 
there was no relation between the market-
ing of the darts and subsequent injury. In 
addition, the Court commented: 
"We are not concerned in this case with 
the liability of the proprietors of the gro-
cery store who sold the darts to the eight-
year-old boy, but with the liability of the 
defendant [wholesaler], who sold the 
darts to the proprietors of the grocery 
store. There was no contention or proof 
that the darts were in any way defective, 
and the appellate court emphasized that 
it was not characterizing them as 'inher-
ently dangerous/ In this court, however, 
the plaintiff urges that the defendants 
4
 "non-defective" dart manifestly was not 
safe when used by small children for the 
purpose for which it was intended. The 
dart in question was intended to be 
thrown at various objects * * *. Its 
propensity to cause serious injury, partic-
ularly to the eyes, was demonstrated by 
the very injury suffered by the infant 
plaintiff in the instant case/ 
"There are many things used by chil-
dren that may be said to be unsafe when 
7. Plaintiff also asserts that Crowther v Ross 
Chemical & Manufacturing Co, 42 MichApp 
426, 202 N W 2d 577 (1972), is a case in point 
This action was brought to recover for the 
wrongful death of two young girls who were 
killed by a man who had allegedly been sniffing 
glue manufactured by defendant The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment was inappropriate be-
cause 
"It is an issue of fact whether, as plaintiff 
alleges in his complaint, the practice of glue 
I.W.2d759 
used for the purpose for which they are 
intended. A baseball, a baseball bat, a 
penknife, a Boy Scout hatchet, a bicycle, 
all have the capacity to injure the user or 
others in the course of their normal use. 
They are not, however, to be categorized 
as 'dangerous instrumentalities/ As was 
said by the Tennessee court in Highsaw 
v Creech, 17 Tenn.App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 
249, 252 [1934], 'an air gun is not a dan-
gerous instrumentality of itself, but is in 
fact a toy. * * * The fact alone that 
an injury may be inflicted by such a toy 
does not make of it a dangerous instru-
mentality in the sense that the term is 
generally used/ In Morris v. Toy Box 
(1962), 204 Cal.App.2d 468, 22 Cal.Rptr. 
572, 574-575, a complaint brought by a 
minor against a retailer alleging that the 
retailer knew that the intended user of a 
bow and arrow was the purchaser's ten-
year-old boy was dismissed, the court say-
ing, 'the bow and arrow has been in use 
by young and old alike for thousands of 
years. * * * To us it is simply incon-
ceivable that a 10-year-old boy, much less 
his mother, would be unacquainted with 
the use of so common an article as the 
one here in question/ See also, White v. 
Page (Ohio App 1950), 105 N.E.2d 652." 
supra, 35 I11.2d 49, 51-52; 219 N.E.2d 472, 
473, 474. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in At-
kins v. Arlan's Department Store of Nor-
man, 522 P.2d 1020 (Okl.1974), quoted the 
above from Pitts v. Basile in concluding 
that there was no cause of action for plain-
tiff against the manufacturer and retailer 
of a lawn dart game for injury caused when 
a lawn dart struck the eye of a child. That 
court concluded: 
sniffing was, at this time, sufficiently notorious 
that defendant knew or should have known this 
was an alternative use for its product" 
In Crowther, however, summary judgment on 
the pleadings alone was involved Here we 
have a directed verdict granted after plaintiff 
has presented all his proofs The thrust of 
decision in Crowther was that plaintiff be given 
an opportunity to present proofs In the 
present case plaintiff enjoyed such opportunity 
Crowther is therefore not of decisional signifi-
cance to the case before us. 
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"There are many toys and playthings, 
perfectly harmless and inoffensive in 
themselves, but whose common use can 
be perverted into a dangerous use and 
design, and there are very few of the 
most harmless toys which cannot be used 
to injure another. The dart's propensi-
ties to cause injury is demonstrated by 
the injury sustained but the fact that an 
injury was sustained does not necessarily 
mean that the manufacturer or retailer 
are liable for those injuries. 
* * * * * * 
8. The talismanic label "inherently dangerous" 
attained significance because a finding of "in-
herent dangerousness" avoided the privity re-
quirement of contract law subjecting the 
wholesaler, manufacturer or retailer to liability 
in tort. Plaintiffs complaint is framed in terms 
of negligence. The doctrine of "inherent dan-
gerousness" is not of decisional significance to 
the case at hand. 
9. The California court at this point footnotes 
the following: 
Plaintiff refers us to § 390 of the ] 
statement of Torts, 2d, indicating that t 
section affords a basis for liability. T 
section states: 
"One who supplies directly or throi 
a third person a chattel for the use 
another whom the supplier knows or 
reason to know to be likely because of 
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to 
it in a manner involving unreasons 
risk of physical harm to himself and < 
ers whom the supplier should expecl 
share in or be endangered by its us< 
subject to liability for physical harm 
suiting to them." 
A similar contention was rejected by 
California Court of Appeals in Bojorqut 
House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal.App.3d 930, 
133 Cal.Rptr. 483, 484 (1976), with the 
lowing remarks. 
"A ten cent slingshot is a toy althc 
its use, like the use of other toys, sue 
baseball bats and bows and arrows, 
cause injury to others. The cases 
have found under section 390 and 
illustrations provided in the Restate] 
all involve the sale or entrustment 
chattel to a particular individual wh 
legedly was known to the seller to b 
young, inexperienced or incompetei 
use the item properly. 
"Here [plaintiff] wants us to hol< 
retailer and distributor negligent for 
ing toy slingshots to the class of pe 
for whom they were intended 
young; in effect, she asks us to ba 
sale of toy slingshots by judicial 
Such a limitation is within the purvi 
the Legislature, not the judiciary." 
The illustrations to the Restatement 
cate that that section was intended to 
when knowledge of an individual's ci 
"'And David prevailed over the Phi 
with a sling and a stone, and he stnic 
slew the Philistine.' (1 Kings 17.50)" 
10. The New Jersey Superior Court si 
commented that a plastic slingshot wai 
dangerous instrumentality in Levis v Z 
72 N.J.Super. 168, 178 A.2d 44 (1962), 
involving injury sustained as a result c 
fective slingshot. 
The dart in question was not designed 
or manufactured to be thrown at an indi-
vidual but at a plastic ring or another 
target." supra, 1022. 
In Morris v. Toy Box, 204 Cal.App.2d 468, 
22 Cal.Rptr. 572 (1962), the Second District 
Court of Appeals of California faced the 
allegation of plaintiff that the retailer of a 
bow and arrow was liable for injuries sus-
tained by a child who had been struck by an 
arrow shot by the son of the buyer of the 
bow and arrow. The California court re-
jected the notion that a bow and arrow 
were "inherently dangerous",8 and com-
mented: 
"As in the case of a slingshot,9 the bow 
and arrow has been in use by young and 
old alike for thousands of years; its 
method of operation, therefore, is a mat-
ter so notorious to all that production of 
evidence relative thereto would be unnec-
essary * * *." (Emphasis supplied.) 
supra, 472, 22 Cal.Rptr. 574. 
The court concluded there was no duty on 
the part of the retailer to warn of the 
dangers incident to the bow and arrows' use 
and found no cause of action.10 
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stances indicates to the supplier reasonable 
likelihood that the individual supplied is 
incompetent to use the chattel supplied and 
may therefore cause harm to himself and 
others. Plaintiff in this case seeks an ex-
tension of the Restatement doctrine to rec-
ognize the status of children, rather than 
circumstances concerning an individual 
child, and in relation thereto to circum-
scribe with duty the distribution of toys, 
the misuse of which involves a likelihood of 
injury—f. e., here, slingshots. 
Ill 
In our view we are being asked to per-
form a legislative task. If we were to find 
a duty on the part of defendants not to 
supply slingshots to children, we would in 
effect be making a value judgment and 
saying to defendants and their counterparts 
that such—in this instance—toys should not 
be manufactured or marketed. 
As has been noted, slingshots have a long 
history of association with the human race. 
Indeed, anyone can make one from a tree 
branch and a piece of inner tube. We ac-
knowledge that there are dangers incident 
to their use and that such dangers are mag-
nified when slingshots are used by minors. 
In the case of use by a minor, the law 
recognizes that parents have some responsi-
bility of supervision. See, e. g., Whalen v. 
Bennett, supra. Cf. Chaddock v. Plummer, 
supra. 
In the absence of legislative prescription 
circumscribing the manufacture, distribu-
tion, or sale of slingshots or providing that 
defendants insure against the misuse of 
their products, we are unable to find a duty 
upon which the liability of defendants may 
be premised. 
We would affirm. 
COLEMAN, J., concurs. 
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( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM) : STEM} 
Action was brought against realty com-
pany by prospective purchaser for return of 
deposit made to company toward purchase 
of real estate, and realty company counter-
claimed for its full commission plus $10,200. 
The Macomb County Circuit Court, George 
R. Deneweth, J., granted realty company 
summary judgment for full amount of its 
counterclaim, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, R. B. Burns, J., held that: 
(1) realty company was bound by its obliga-
tions to vendor to submit any offers it 
received to vendor irrespective of irrevoca-
bility clause in its contract with prospective 
purchaser, and (2) realty company's promise 
to exert effort to obtain vendor's approval 
of prospective purchaser's offer was an un-
enforceable promise and did not constitute, 
consideration to support irrevocability 
clause by which prospective purchaser's of-
fer was purportedly made irrevocable for 
15-day period. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Brokers <s=»32 
Realty company was bound by its obli-
gations to vendor to submit any offers it 
received to vendor irrespective of irrevoca-
bility clause in realty company's contract 
with prospective purchaser, by which pro-
spective purchaser's offer was purportedly 
made irrevocable for 15-day period in ex-
change for realty company's promise to ex-
ert effort to obtain vendor's approval of 
such offer, and it would have been breach 
